Solving zero-sum multi-objective games with a-priori secondary criteria

Meir Harel*, Erella Eisenstadt-Matalon, Amiram Moshaiov

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Solving non-cooperative zero-sum multi-objective Games (zsMOGs), under undecided objective preferences results, for each of the players, in a Set of Rationalizable Strategies (SRS) to choose from. First, this paper deals with finding for each of the players a preferred subset of such rationalizable strategies based on a-priori incorporation of partial preferences of the decision-makers using secondary criteria. The obtained subset is termed the Set of Preferred Strategies (SPS). Here, a novel archive-based co-evolutionary algorithm is suggested to search for the SPS for each of the players. An academic example is suggested to demonstrate and validate the algorithm. It concerns a zsMOG that involves two adversarial planar manipulators. Based on a theorem that is proven here, a theoretic reference SRS is found for each of the players. This reference SRS is applied to find a reference SPS, which is used for validating the algorithm. Next, a comparison study is performed between the proposed archive-based co-evolutionary algorithm and an elite-based version of this algorithm. The results clearly show that the archive-based algorithm is superior to the elite-based version, yielding results that correspond well to the theoretic sets.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3-23
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis
Volume30
Issue number1-2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2023

Funding

FundersFunder number
Ministry of Science and Technology, Israel

    Keywords

    • Pareto optimization
    • multi-criteria decision-making
    • multi-objective game
    • multi-payoff game
    • non-cooperative game
    • rationalizable strategies

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