TY - GEN

T1 - Solving cooperative reliability games

AU - Bachrach, Yoram

AU - Meir, Reshef

AU - Feldman, Michal

AU - Tennenholtz, Moshe

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the reliability extension, each agent only "survives" with a certain probability, and a coalition's value is the probability that its surviving members would be a winning coalition in the base game. We study prominent solution concepts in such games, showing how to approximate the Shapley value and how to compute the core in games with few agent types. We also show that applying the reliability extension may stabilize the game, making the core non-empty even when the base game has an empty core.

AB - Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the reliability extension, each agent only "survives" with a certain probability, and a coalition's value is the probability that its surviving members would be a winning coalition in the base game. We study prominent solution concepts in such games, showing how to approximate the Shapley value and how to compute the core in games with few agent types. We also show that applying the reliability extension may stabilize the game, making the core non-empty even when the base game has an empty core.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=80053157815&partnerID=8YFLogxK

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AN - SCOPUS:80053157815

T3 - Proceedings of the 27th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2011

SP - 27

EP - 34

BT - Proceedings of the 27th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2011

PB - AUAI Press

ER -