Solving cooperative reliability games

Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the reliability extension, each agent only "survives" with a certain probability, and a coalition's value is the probability that its surviving members would be a winning coalition in the base game. We study prominent solution concepts in such games, showing how to approximate the Shapley value and how to compute the core in games with few agent types. We also show that applying the reliability extension may stabilize the game, making the core non-empty even when the base game has an empty core.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 27th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2011
PublisherAUAI Press
Pages27-34
Number of pages8
StatePublished - 2011
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 27th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2011

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Solving cooperative reliability games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this