Social welfare functions when preferences are convex, strictly monotonic, and continuous

Ehud Kalai, Eitan Muller, Mark A. Satterthwaite

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The paper shows that if the class of admissible preference orderings is restricted in a manner appropriate for economic and political models, then Arrow's impossibility theorem for social welfare functions continues to be valid. Specifically if the space of alternatives is R+n, n ≥ 3, where each dimension represents a different public good and if each person's preferences are restricted to be convex, continuous, and strictly monotonic, then no social welfare function exists that satisfies unanimity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and nondictatorship.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)87-97
Number of pages11
JournalPublic Choice
Volume34
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1979

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