Single valued combinatorial auctions with budgets

Amos Fiat*, Stefano Leonardi, Jared Saia, Piotr Sankowski

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

42 Scopus citations


We consider budget constrained combinatorial auctions where each bidder has a private value for each of the items in some subset of the items and an overall budget constraint. Such auctions capture adword auctions, where advertisers offer a bid for those adwords that (hopefully) target their intended audience, and advertisers also have budgets. It is known that even if all items are identical and all budgets are public it is not possible to be truthful and efficient. Our main result is a novel auction that runs in polynomial time, is incentive compatible, and ensures Pareto-optimality. The auction is incentive compatible with respect to the private valuations whereas the budgets and the sets of interest are assumed to be public knowledge. This extends the result of Dobzinski, Lavi and Nisan (FOCS 2008) for auctions of multiple identical items with bugets to single-valued combinatorial auctions and address one of the basic challenges on auctioning web ads (see Nisan et al, 2009, Google auctions for tv ads).

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEC'11 - Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Number of pages10
StatePublished - 2011
Event12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'11 - San Jose, CA, United States
Duration: 5 Jun 20119 Jun 2011

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce


Conference12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'11
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Jose, CA


  • combinatorial auctions
  • multi-unit auctions
  • pareto-optimality
  • truthfulness


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