Simultaneous moves multi-person continuous time concession game

Chaim Fershtman*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The alternating offers strategic bargaining approach (Rubinstein, 1982) suggest a unique perfect equilibrium. In this equilibrium the bargaining ends immediately and the outcome is Pareto optimal. In this paper we consider a bargaining game in which players move simultaneously. Since we allow players only to lower their demands over time we denote this game as a concession game. We demonstrate that in this game there is a perfect equilibrium in which the bargaining lasts long enough so that the pie shrinks to zero. We show that we can generalize this game to a multi-player concession game in a straightforward manner and so avoiding the difficulties of generalizing the alternating offers game to the multi-player case.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)81-90
Number of pages10
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume26
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1989
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • concession games
  • multi-person bargaining
  • simultaneous moves

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