In this study I examine the sole detailed evidence we have for Simplicius' view of sign-based, i.e. tekmeriodic proofs, thereby questing the widespread assumption that he espouses Philoponus' account of these proofs. Specifically, I argue that (1) it is more plausible to understand the signs on which Simplicius bases his tekmeriodic proofs as refutable, (2) he grounds the epistemic worth of these proofs in the evidential strength of their premises rather than in their validity, (3) unlike Philoponus, he conceives of the argument that leads to the principles of natural philosophy, which tekmeriodic proofs are aimed to prove, as inductive, and (4) he evaluates these proofs against Plato's un-hypothetical science, hence denying natural philosophy the autonomy from metaphysics that Philoponus' account of tekmeriodic proofs grants.
|Number of pages||10|
|Journal||Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A|
|State||Published - Jun 2012|
- Alexander of Aphrodisias
- Autonomy of natural philosophy
- Tekmeriodic proofs