TY - JOUR
T1 - Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proofs
AU - Harari, Orna
N1 - Funding Information:
This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (Grant No. 536/07 ) and carried out while I was a fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin. Both institutions are hereby gratefully acknowledged. I am grateful to Gábor Betegh and Christoph Helmig for their valuable comments on a lecture that I gave on tekmeriodic proofs at the Topoi excellence cluster, Berlin. I would also like to thank Geoffrey Lloyd and Richard Sorabji for their thorough and challenging comments on an earlier written version of this article and my friend Itzhak Gilboa for numerous discussions that helped me clarify my position.
PY - 2012/6
Y1 - 2012/6
N2 - In this study I examine the sole detailed evidence we have for Simplicius' view of sign-based, i.e. tekmeriodic proofs, thereby questing the widespread assumption that he espouses Philoponus' account of these proofs. Specifically, I argue that (1) it is more plausible to understand the signs on which Simplicius bases his tekmeriodic proofs as refutable, (2) he grounds the epistemic worth of these proofs in the evidential strength of their premises rather than in their validity, (3) unlike Philoponus, he conceives of the argument that leads to the principles of natural philosophy, which tekmeriodic proofs are aimed to prove, as inductive, and (4) he evaluates these proofs against Plato's un-hypothetical science, hence denying natural philosophy the autonomy from metaphysics that Philoponus' account of tekmeriodic proofs grants.
AB - In this study I examine the sole detailed evidence we have for Simplicius' view of sign-based, i.e. tekmeriodic proofs, thereby questing the widespread assumption that he espouses Philoponus' account of these proofs. Specifically, I argue that (1) it is more plausible to understand the signs on which Simplicius bases his tekmeriodic proofs as refutable, (2) he grounds the epistemic worth of these proofs in the evidential strength of their premises rather than in their validity, (3) unlike Philoponus, he conceives of the argument that leads to the principles of natural philosophy, which tekmeriodic proofs are aimed to prove, as inductive, and (4) he evaluates these proofs against Plato's un-hypothetical science, hence denying natural philosophy the autonomy from metaphysics that Philoponus' account of tekmeriodic proofs grants.
KW - Alexander of Aphrodisias
KW - Autonomy of natural philosophy
KW - Philoponus
KW - Simplicius
KW - Tekmeriodic proofs
KW - Themistius
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84859849504&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.12.032
DO - 10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.12.032
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AN - SCOPUS:84859849504
SN - 0039-3681
VL - 43
SP - 366
EP - 375
JO - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
JF - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
IS - 2
ER -