Abstract
I explore the idea of simplicity as a belief-selection criterion in games. A pair of strategies in finite-automata representation (s1, s2) is a Simple Nash Equilibrium (SINE) if: (1) sj is a best-reply to si; (2) every automaton for player j, which generates the same path as sj (given si), has at least as many states as sj. I apply SINE to a bilateral concession game and show that it captures an aspect of bargaining behavior: players employ delay tactics in order to justify their concessions. Delay tactics are mutually reinforcing, and this may prevent players from reaching an interior agreement.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 200-220 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 2004 |
Keywords
- Bargaining
- Complexity
- Delay
- Justifiability
- Nash equilibrium
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