Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game

Ran Spiegler*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


I explore the idea of simplicity as a belief-selection criterion in games. A pair of strategies in finite-automata representation (s1, s2) is a Simple Nash Equilibrium (SINE) if: (1) sj is a best-reply to si; (2) every automaton for player j, which generates the same path as sj (given si), has at least as many states as sj. I apply SINE to a bilateral concession game and show that it captures an aspect of bargaining behavior: players employ delay tactics in order to justify their concessions. Delay tactics are mutually reinforcing, and this may prevent players from reaching an interior agreement.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)200-220
Number of pages21
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number1
StatePublished - Apr 2004


  • Bargaining
  • Complexity
  • Delay
  • Justifiability
  • Nash equilibrium


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