TY - JOUR
T1 - Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game
AU - Spiegler, Ran
PY - 2004/4
Y1 - 2004/4
N2 - I explore the idea of simplicity as a belief-selection criterion in games. A pair of strategies in finite-automata representation (s1, s2) is a Simple Nash Equilibrium (SINE) if: (1) sj is a best-reply to si; (2) every automaton for player j, which generates the same path as sj (given si), has at least as many states as sj. I apply SINE to a bilateral concession game and show that it captures an aspect of bargaining behavior: players employ delay tactics in order to justify their concessions. Delay tactics are mutually reinforcing, and this may prevent players from reaching an interior agreement.
AB - I explore the idea of simplicity as a belief-selection criterion in games. A pair of strategies in finite-automata representation (s1, s2) is a Simple Nash Equilibrium (SINE) if: (1) sj is a best-reply to si; (2) every automaton for player j, which generates the same path as sj (given si), has at least as many states as sj. I apply SINE to a bilateral concession game and show that it captures an aspect of bargaining behavior: players employ delay tactics in order to justify their concessions. Delay tactics are mutually reinforcing, and this may prevent players from reaching an interior agreement.
KW - Bargaining
KW - Complexity
KW - Delay
KW - Justifiability
KW - Nash equilibrium
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=1842554295&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00180-5
DO - 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00180-5
M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???
AN - SCOPUS:1842554295
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 47
SP - 200
EP - 220
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 1
ER -