TY - JOUR
T1 - Similarity Nash Equilibria in Statistical Games
AU - Argenziano, Rossella
AU - Gilboa, Itzhak
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© (2023). All Rights Reserved.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - A statistical game is a game in which strategic interaction is mediated via a binary outcome y, coupled with a prediction problem where a characteristic x of the game may be used to predict its outcome y based on past values of (x,y). In Similarity Nash Equilibria, players combine statistical and strategic reasoning, using an estimate of y as a coordination device. They predict y by its similarity-weighted frequency and learn the optimal notion of similarity from the data. We prove that the model captures the importance of precedents and the endogenous formation of sunspots.
AB - A statistical game is a game in which strategic interaction is mediated via a binary outcome y, coupled with a prediction problem where a characteristic x of the game may be used to predict its outcome y based on past values of (x,y). In Similarity Nash Equilibria, players combine statistical and strategic reasoning, using an estimate of y as a coordination device. They predict y by its similarity-weighted frequency and learn the optimal notion of similarity from the data. We prove that the model captures the importance of precedents and the endogenous formation of sunspots.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85169052562&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1257/MIC.20220049
DO - 10.1257/MIC.20220049
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AN - SCOPUS:85169052562
SN - 1945-7669
VL - 15
SP - 354
EP - 386
JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
IS - 3
ER -