Siblings, strangers, and the surge of altruism

Oded Stark*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We demonstrate how altruism can surge in a population of nonaltruists. We assume that each individual plays a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game with his or her sibling, or with a stranger, and that the probability that an individual survives to reproduce is proportional to his or her payoff in this game. We model the formation of couples and the rule of imitation of parents and of nonparents. We then ask what happens to the proportion of altruists in the population. We specify a case where the unique and stable equilibrium is one in which the entire population will consist of altruists.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)135-142
Number of pages8
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume65
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1999
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • A13
  • D64
  • Evolution of altruism
  • One-shot prisoner's dilemma game
  • Siblings and strangers

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Siblings, strangers, and the surge of altruism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this