TY - JOUR
T1 - Siblings, strangers, and the surge of altruism
AU - Stark, Oded
N1 - Funding Information:
This paper evolves from joint work with Theodore C. Bergstrom. I am grateful to Ken Binmore for enlightening conversations and to Aanund Hylland for constructive comments. I thank the National Institute on Aging (grant R01-AG13037) for partial financial support.
PY - 1999/11
Y1 - 1999/11
N2 - We demonstrate how altruism can surge in a population of nonaltruists. We assume that each individual plays a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game with his or her sibling, or with a stranger, and that the probability that an individual survives to reproduce is proportional to his or her payoff in this game. We model the formation of couples and the rule of imitation of parents and of nonparents. We then ask what happens to the proportion of altruists in the population. We specify a case where the unique and stable equilibrium is one in which the entire population will consist of altruists.
AB - We demonstrate how altruism can surge in a population of nonaltruists. We assume that each individual plays a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game with his or her sibling, or with a stranger, and that the probability that an individual survives to reproduce is proportional to his or her payoff in this game. We model the formation of couples and the rule of imitation of parents and of nonparents. We then ask what happens to the proportion of altruists in the population. We specify a case where the unique and stable equilibrium is one in which the entire population will consist of altruists.
KW - A13
KW - D64
KW - Evolution of altruism
KW - One-shot prisoner's dilemma game
KW - Siblings and strangers
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0033417430&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00157-3
DO - 10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00157-3
M3 - מאמר
AN - SCOPUS:0033417430
VL - 65
SP - 135
EP - 142
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
IS - 2
ER -