Sequential Equilibrium in Games of Imperfect Recall

Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Although the definition of sequential equilibrium can be applied without change to games of imperfect recall, doing so leads to arguably inappropriate results. We redefine sequential equilibrium so that the definition agrees with the standard definition in games of perfect recall while still giving reasonable results in games of imperfect recall. The definition can be viewed as trying to capture a notion of ex ante sequential equilibrium. The picture here is that players choose their strategies before the game starts and are committed to it, but they choose it in such a way that it remains optimal even off the equilibrium path. A notion of interim sequential equilibrium is also considered.

Original languageEnglish
Article number3485002
JournalACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume9
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2021
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Absentmindedness
  • imperfect recall
  • sequential equilibrium

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Sequential Equilibrium in Games of Imperfect Recall'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this