Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma

Kfir Eliaz*, Roberto Serrano

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Consider the problem of information disclosure for a planner who faces two agents interacting in a state-dependent multi-action prisoners' dilemma. We find conditions under which the planner can make use of his superior information by disclosing some of it to the agents, and conditions under which such information leakage is not possible. Although the problem is entirely symmetric, the planner's only way to reveal part of the information is based on creating asymmetries between the two agents by giving them different pieces of information. We also find conditions under which such partially informative equilibria are the planner's best equilibria.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)245-267
Number of pages23
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - May 2014


  • Generalized prisoners' dilemma
  • Information disclosure
  • Partially or fully informative equilibria
  • Uninformative equilibria


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