Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate

Yair Tauman; Ming Hung Weng

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.023

Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate

Yair Tauman^*, Ming Hung Weng

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

16 Scopus citations

Abstract

We show that an outside innovator has a higher incentive to innovate than an incumbent innovator, by auctioning off his patent rights exclusively to an incumbent firm. For significant innovations this is also superior to selling licenses directly.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	241-244
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	114
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.023
State	Published - Mar 2012
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Cournot oligopoly
Incentive to innovate
Patent licensing
Patent rights
Process innovation

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.023

Cite this

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abstract = "We show that an outside innovator has a higher incentive to innovate than an incumbent innovator, by auctioning off his patent rights exclusively to an incumbent firm. For significant innovations this is also superior to selling licenses directly.",

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Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

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