Security analysis of IKE’s signature-based key-exchange protocol

Ran Canetti, Hugo Krawczyk

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

124 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present a security analysis of the Diffie-Hellman keyexchange protocol authenticated with digital signatures used by the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) standard. The analysis is based on an adaptation of the key-exchange model from [Canetti and Krawczyk, Eurocrypt’ 01] to the setting where peers identities are not necessarily known or disclosed from the start of the protocol. This is a common practical setting, including the case of IKE and other protocols that provide confidentiality of identities over the network. The formal study of this “post-specified peer” model is a further contribution of this paper.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAdvances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2002 - 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference, Proceedings
EditorsMoti Yung
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages143-161
Number of pages19
ISBN (Electronic)354044050X, 9783540440505
DOIs
StatePublished - 2002
Externally publishedYes
Event22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2002 - Santa Barbara, United States
Duration: 18 Aug 200222 Aug 2002

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume2442
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2002
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySanta Barbara
Period18/08/0222/08/02

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