Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting

Martin J. Osborne; Ariel Rubinstein

doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00147-7

Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting

Martin J. Osborne^*, Ariel Rubinstein

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	434-441
Number of pages	8
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	45
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00147-7
State	Published - Nov 2003

Keywords

Bounded rationality
Sampling equilibrium
Strategic voting

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abstract = "We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates.",

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AB - We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates.

KW - Bounded rationality

KW - Sampling equilibrium

KW - Strategic voting

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Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting

Abstract

Keywords

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