Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting

Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)434-441
Number of pages8
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume45
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2003

Keywords

  • Bounded rationality
  • Sampling equilibrium
  • Strategic voting

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