@article{72a4f02e8c064558ba65c30f1658f551,
title = "Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting",
abstract = "We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates.",
keywords = "Bounded rationality, Sampling equilibrium, Strategic voting",
author = "Osborne, {Martin J.} and Ariel Rubinstein",
note = "Funding Information: Martin J. Osborne gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Connaught Foundation of the University of Toronto.",
year = "2003",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00147-7",
language = "אנגלית",
volume = "45",
pages = "434--441",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "2",
}