RSA/Rabin least significant bits are (Fomula presented.) secure (Extended Abstract)

Benny Chor; Oded Goldreich

doi:10.1007/3-540-39568-7_24

RSA/Rabin least significant bits are (Fomula presented.) secure (Extended Abstract)

Benny Chor
, Oded Goldreich

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

We prove that RSA least significant bit is (Fomula presented.) secure, for any constant c (where N is the RSA modulus). This means that an adversary, given the ciphertext, cannot guess the least significant bit of the plaintext with probability better than (Fomula presented.), unless he can break RSA. Our proof technique is strong enough to give, with slight modifications, the following related results:(1)The loglog N least significant bits are simultaneously (Fomula presented.) secure.(2)The above also holds for Rabin’s encryption function. Our results imply that Rabin/RSA encryption can be directly used for pseudo random bits generation, provided that factoring/inverting RSA is hard.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO 84
Editors	David Chaum, George Robert Blakley
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	303-313
Number of pages	11
ISBN (Print)	9783540156581
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39568-7_24
State	Published - 1985
Externally published	Yes
Event	Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 1984 - Santa Barbara, United States Duration: 19 Aug 1984 → 22 Aug 1984

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	196 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 1984
Country/Territory	United States
City	Santa Barbara
Period	19/08/84 → 22/08/84

Access to Document

10.1007/3-540-39568-7_24

Cite this

Chor, B., & Goldreich, O. (1985). RSA/Rabin least significant bits are (Fomula presented.) secure (Extended Abstract). In D. Chaum, & G. R. Blakley (Eds.), Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 (pp. 303-313). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 196 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39568-7_24

Chor, Benny ; Goldreich, Oded. / RSA/Rabin least significant bits are (Fomula presented.) secure (Extended Abstract). Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO 84. editor / David Chaum ; George Robert Blakley. Springer Verlag, 1985. pp. 303-313 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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title = "RSA/Rabin least significant bits are (Fomula presented.) secure (Extended Abstract)",

abstract = "We prove that RSA least significant bit is (Fomula presented.) secure, for any constant c (where N is the RSA modulus). This means that an adversary, given the ciphertext, cannot guess the least significant bit of the plaintext with probability better than (Fomula presented.), unless he can break RSA. Our proof technique is strong enough to give, with slight modifications, the following related results:(1)The loglog N least significant bits are simultaneously (Fomula presented.) secure.(2)The above also holds for Rabin{\textquoteright}s encryption function. Our results imply that Rabin/RSA encryption can be directly used for pseudo random bits generation, provided that factoring/inverting RSA is hard.",

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Chor, B & Goldreich, O 1985, RSA/Rabin least significant bits are (Fomula presented.) secure (Extended Abstract). in D Chaum & GR Blakley (eds), Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO 84. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 196 LNCS, Springer Verlag, pp. 303-313, Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 1984, Santa Barbara, United States, 19/08/84. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39568-7_24

RSA/Rabin least significant bits are (Fomula presented.) secure (Extended Abstract). / Chor, Benny; Goldreich, Oded.
Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO 84. ed. / David Chaum; George Robert Blakley. Springer Verlag, 1985. p. 303-313 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 196 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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N2 - We prove that RSA least significant bit is (Fomula presented.) secure, for any constant c (where N is the RSA modulus). This means that an adversary, given the ciphertext, cannot guess the least significant bit of the plaintext with probability better than (Fomula presented.), unless he can break RSA. Our proof technique is strong enough to give, with slight modifications, the following related results:(1)The loglog N least significant bits are simultaneously (Fomula presented.) secure.(2)The above also holds for Rabin’s encryption function. Our results imply that Rabin/RSA encryption can be directly used for pseudo random bits generation, provided that factoring/inverting RSA is hard.

AB - We prove that RSA least significant bit is (Fomula presented.) secure, for any constant c (where N is the RSA modulus). This means that an adversary, given the ciphertext, cannot guess the least significant bit of the plaintext with probability better than (Fomula presented.), unless he can break RSA. Our proof technique is strong enough to give, with slight modifications, the following related results:(1)The loglog N least significant bits are simultaneously (Fomula presented.) secure.(2)The above also holds for Rabin’s encryption function. Our results imply that Rabin/RSA encryption can be directly used for pseudo random bits generation, provided that factoring/inverting RSA is hard.

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Chor B, Goldreich O. RSA/Rabin least significant bits are (Fomula presented.) secure (Extended Abstract). In Chaum D, Blakley GR, editors, Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO 84. Springer Verlag. 1985. p. 303-313. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/3-540-39568-7_24

RSA/Rabin least significant bits are (Fomula presented.) secure (Extended Abstract)

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