@inproceedings{f266bf1d5c85402c826a41fba9dff3a0,
title = "Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets",
abstract = "We study envy-free (EF) mechanisms for multi-unit auctions with budgeted agents that approximately maximize revenue. In an EF auction, prices are set so that every bidder receives a bundle that maximizes her utility amongst all bundles; We show that the problem of revenue-maximizing EF auctions is NP-hard, even for the case of identical items and additive valuations (up to the budget). The main result of our paper is a novel EF auction that runs in polynomial time and provides a approximation of 1/2 with respect to the revenue-maximizing EF auction. A slight variant of our mechanism will produce an allocation and pricing that is more restrictive (so called item pricing) and gives a 1/2 approximation to the optimal revenue within this more restrictive class.",
keywords = "envy-free, multi-unit auctions with budgetes, revenue-maximizing",
author = "Michal Feldman and Amos Fiat and Stefano Leonardi and Piotr Sankowski",
year = "2012",
doi = "10.1145/2229012.2229052",
language = "אנגלית",
isbn = "9781450314152",
series = "Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce",
pages = "532--549",
booktitle = "EC '12 - Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce",
note = "13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC '12 ; Conference date: 04-06-2012 Through 08-06-2012",
}