Revenue enhancement in ad auctions

Michal Feldman; Reshef Meir; Moshe Tennenholtz

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_34

Revenue enhancement in ad auctions

Michal Feldman^*, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider the revenue of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction, which is one of the most widely used mechanisms for ad auctions. While the standard model of ad auctions implies that the revenue of GSP in equilibrium is at least as high as the revenue of VCG, the literature suggests that it is not strictly higher due to the selection of a natural equilibrium that coincides with the VCG outcome. We propose a randomized modification of the GSP mechanism, which eliminates the low-revenue equilibria of the GSP mechanism under some natural restrictions. The proposed mechanism leads to a higher revenue to the seller.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Proceedings
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	391-398
Number of pages	8
ISBN (Print)	9783642255090
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_34
State	Published - 2011
Externally published	Yes
Event	7th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2011 - Singapore, Singapore Duration: 11 Dec 2011 → 14 Dec 2011

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	7090 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	7th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2011
Country/Territory	Singapore
City	Singapore
Period	11/12/11 → 14/12/11

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10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_34

Cite this

Feldman, M., Meir, R., & Tennenholtz, M. (2011). Revenue enhancement in ad auctions. In Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Proceedings (pp. 391-398). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 7090 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_34

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title = "Revenue enhancement in ad auctions",

abstract = "We consider the revenue of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction, which is one of the most widely used mechanisms for ad auctions. While the standard model of ad auctions implies that the revenue of GSP in equilibrium is at least as high as the revenue of VCG, the literature suggests that it is not strictly higher due to the selection of a natural equilibrium that coincides with the VCG outcome. We propose a randomized modification of the GSP mechanism, which eliminates the low-revenue equilibria of the GSP mechanism under some natural restrictions. The proposed mechanism leads to a higher revenue to the seller.",

author = "Michal Feldman and Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz",

year = "2011",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_34",

language = "אנגלית",

isbn = "9783642255090",

series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",

publisher = "Springer Verlag",

pages = "391--398",

booktitle = "Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Proceedings",

note = "7th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2011 ; Conference date: 11-12-2011 Through 14-12-2011",

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Feldman, M, Meir, R & Tennenholtz, M 2011, Revenue enhancement in ad auctions. in Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7090 LNCS, Springer Verlag, pp. 391-398, 7th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2011, Singapore, Singapore, 11/12/11. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_34

Revenue enhancement in ad auctions. / Feldman, Michal; Meir, Reshef; Tennenholtz, Moshe.
Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Proceedings. Springer Verlag, 2011. p. 391-398 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 7090 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Revenue enhancement in ad auctions

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