Repeated games over networks with vector payoffs: The notion of attainability

Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan, Dario Bauso

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We introduce the concept of strongly attainable sets of payoffs in two-player repeated games with vector payoffs in continuous time. A set of payoffs is called strongly attainable if player 1 has a strategy guaranteeing, even in the worst case, that the distance between the set and the cumulative payoff shrinks with time to zero. We characterize when any vector is strongly attainable and illustrate the motivation of our study on a multi-inventory application.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternational Conference on NETwork Games, Control and Optimization, NetGCooP 2011
StatePublished - 2011
EventInternational Conference on NETwork Games, Control and Optimization, NetGCooP 2011 - Paris, France
Duration: 12 Oct 201114 Oct 2011

Publication series

NameInternational Conference on NETwork Games, Control and Optimization, NetGCooP 2011

Conference

ConferenceInternational Conference on NETwork Games, Control and Optimization, NetGCooP 2011
Country/TerritoryFrance
CityParis
Period12/10/1114/10/11

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