Remarks on Infinitely Repeated Extensive-Form Games

Ariel Rubinstein, Asher Wolinsky

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

18 Scopus citations


Let Γ be a game in extensive form and G be its reduced normal form game. Let Γ(δ) and G(δ) be the infinitely repeated game versions of Γ and G respectively, with common discount factor δ. This note points out that the set of SPE payoff vectors of Γ(δ) might be different from that of G(δ), even when δ is arbitrarily close to 1. This difference can be substantial when G fails to satisfy the dimensionality conditions of the repeated game literature. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)110-115
Number of pages6
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number1
StatePublished - Apr 1995


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