Regulation under partial cooperation: The case of a queueing system

Gail Gilboa-Freedman, Refael Hassin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Socially optimal behavior can be achieved through the cooperation of the participating agents with a central planner. What happens when only a fraction of the population cooperates? We investigate this question in a Markovian single server queue. The main result is non-intuitive: the optimal control of cooperative customers is independent of their proportion. We also conclude that the gain from controlling cooperative customers after they join the queue is relatively small.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)217-221
Number of pages5
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume42
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2014

Keywords

  • Binary altruism
  • Partial control
  • Queueing

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