Regret minimization for reserve prices in second-price auctions

Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Claudio Gentile, Yishay Mansour

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We show a regret minimization algorithm for setting the reserve price in second-price auctions. We make the assumption that all bidders draw their bids from the same unknown and arbitrary distribution. Our algorithm is computationally efficient, and achieves a regret of Õ(√T), even when the number of bidders is stochastic with a known distribution.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 24th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2013
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages1190-1204
Number of pages15
ISBN (Print)9781611972511
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Event24th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2013 - New Orleans, LA, United States
Duration: 6 Jan 20138 Jan 2013

Publication series

NameProceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Conference

Conference24th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNew Orleans, LA
Period6/01/138/01/13

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