Reexamining staggered boards and shareholder value

Alma Cohen; Charles C.Y. Wang

doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.06.004

Reexamining staggered boards and shareholder value

Alma Cohen, Charles C.Y. Wang^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW2013) provide evidence consistent with market participants perceiving staggered boards to be value reducing. Amihud and Stoyanov (2016) (AS2016) contests these findings, reporting some specifications under which the results are not statistically significant. We show that the results retain their significance under a wide array of robustness tests that address the concerns expressed by AS2016. Our empirical findings reinforce the conclusions of CW2013.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	637-647
Number of pages	11
Journal	Journal of Financial Economics
Volume	125
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.06.004
State	Published - Sep 2017

Keywords

Airgas
Antitakeover provisions
Corporate governance
Delaware
Firm value
Staggered boards
Takeover defense

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10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.06.004

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title = "Reexamining staggered boards and shareholder value",

abstract = "Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW2013) provide evidence consistent with market participants perceiving staggered boards to be value reducing. Amihud and Stoyanov (2016) (AS2016) contests these findings, reporting some specifications under which the results are not statistically significant. We show that the results retain their significance under a wide array of robustness tests that address the concerns expressed by AS2016. Our empirical findings reinforce the conclusions of CW2013.",

keywords = "Airgas, Antitakeover provisions, Corporate governance, Delaware, Firm value, Staggered boards, Takeover defense",

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AB - Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW2013) provide evidence consistent with market participants perceiving staggered boards to be value reducing. Amihud and Stoyanov (2016) (AS2016) contests these findings, reporting some specifications under which the results are not statistically significant. We show that the results retain their significance under a wide array of robustness tests that address the concerns expressed by AS2016. Our empirical findings reinforce the conclusions of CW2013.

KW - Airgas

KW - Antitakeover provisions

KW - Corporate governance

KW - Delaware

KW - Firm value

KW - Staggered boards

KW - Takeover defense

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JO - Journal of Financial Economics

JF - Journal of Financial Economics

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ER -

Reexamining staggered boards and shareholder value

Abstract

Keywords

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