Reexamining staggered boards and shareholder value

Alma Cohen, Charles C.Y. Wang*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW2013) provide evidence consistent with market participants perceiving staggered boards to be value reducing. Amihud and Stoyanov (2016) (AS2016) contests these findings, reporting some specifications under which the results are not statistically significant. We show that the results retain their significance under a wide array of robustness tests that address the concerns expressed by AS2016. Our empirical findings reinforce the conclusions of CW2013.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)637-647
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Financial Economics
Volume125
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2017

Keywords

  • Airgas
  • Antitakeover provisions
  • Corporate governance
  • Delaware
  • Firm value
  • Staggered boards
  • Takeover defense

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