Recovering AES Keys with a Deep Cold Boot Attack

Itamar Zimerman*, Eliya Nachmani*, Lior Wolf*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Cold boot attacks inspect the corrupted random access memory soon after the power has been shut down. While most of the bits have been corrupted, many bits, at random locations, have not. Since the keys in many encryption schemes are being expanded in memory into longer keys with fixed redundancies, the keys can often be restored. In this work, we combine a novel cryptographic variant of a deep error correcting code technique with a modified SAT solver scheme to apply the attack on AES keys. Even though AES consists of Rijndael S-box elements, that are specifically designed to be resistant to linear and differential cryptanalysis, our method provides a novel formalization of the AES key scheduling as a computational graph, which is implemented by a neural message passing network. Our results show that our methods outperform the state of the art attack methods by a very large margin.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 38th International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2021
PublisherML Research Press
Pages12955-12966
Number of pages12
ISBN (Electronic)9781713845065
StatePublished - 2021
Event38th International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2021 - Virtual, Online
Duration: 18 Jul 202124 Jul 2021

Publication series

NameProceedings of Machine Learning Research
Volume139
ISSN (Electronic)2640-3498

Conference

Conference38th International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2021
CityVirtual, Online
Period18/07/2124/07/21

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Recovering AES Keys with a Deep Cold Boot Attack'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this