Reasoning about rationality

A. Bjorndahl*, J. Y. Halpern, R. Pass

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for a class of logics appropriate for reasoning about the rationality of players in games, and show that essentially the same axiomatization applies to a very wide class of decision rules. We also consider games in which players may be uncertain as to what decision rules their opponents are using, and define in this context a new solution concept, D-rationalizability.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)146-164
Number of pages19
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume104
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jul 2017
Externally publishedYes

Funding

FundersFunder number
US government
National Science FoundationCCF-1214844, 1718108, DMS-0852811, 1214844, DMS-1161175, IIS-0812045
Air Force Office of Scientific ResearchFA9550-10-1-0093
Army Research OfficeIIS-0911036, W911NF-09-1-0281
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
Microsoft ResearchCCF-0746990, CNS-1217821
Air Force Research LaboratoryFA8750-11-2-0211
Multidisciplinary University Research InitiativeFA9550-12-1-0040

    Keywords

    • Axiomatization
    • Decision rules
    • Epistemic game theory
    • Rationality
    • Rationalizability

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Reasoning about rationality'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this