A cross-national experimental study examining perceptions of four procedural models for adjudicative conflict resolution was conducted in four countries—the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany—whose legal procedures are based on differing adjudicative models. One hundred seventy-eight subjects rated the four models on a number of dimensions, including their preference for using the model for settling a conflict, the fairness of the model, and the amount of control over the resolution of the conflict vested in each of several roles. Approximately half of the subjects at each site were asked to assume the role of defendant in the adjudicated conflict, and half were asked to assume the role of plaintiff. The results showed a general preference for more “adversary” (disputant-controlled) models over more “inquisitorial” (adjudicator-controlled) models. This preference was not limited to subjects from nations (the United States and Britain) whose legal systems are based on adversary models. The conclusions of the study focused on the relationship between subjects' model preferences and the distribution of control over the adjudicative process among roles, and on the generality of this relationship in the nations studied.
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In: Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2, 06.1978, p. 318-339.
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Reactions to Procedural Models for Adjudicative Conflict Resolution
T2 - A Cross-National Study
AU - Lind, E. Allan
AU - Erickson, Bonnie E.
AU - Friedland, Nehemia
AU - Dickenberger, Michael
N1 - Funding Information: Lind E. Allan Department of Psychology, University of New Hampshire Erickson Bonnie E. Center for the Study of Aging and Human Development, Duke University Friedland Nehemia University of Tel Aviv Dickenberger Michael Lehrstuhl fur Soczialpsychologie, University of Mannheim 06 1978 22 2 318 339 © 1978 Sage Publications, Inc. 1978 Sage Publications, Inc. A cross-national experimental study examining perceptions of four procedural models for adjudicative conflict resolution was conducted in four countries—the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany—whose legal procedures are based on differing adjudicative models. One hundred seventy-eight subjects rated the four models on a number of dimensions, including their preference for using the model for settling a conflict, the fairness of the model, and the amount of control over the resolution of the conflict vested in each of several roles. Approximately half of the subjects at each site were asked to assume the role of defendant in the adjudicated conflict, and half were asked to assume the role of plaintiff. The results showed a general preference for more “adversary” (disputant-controlled) models over more “inquisitorial” (adjudicator-controlled) models. This preference was not limited to subjects from nations (the United States and Britain) whose legal systems are based on adversary models. The conclusions of the study focused on the relationship between subjects' model preferences and the distribution of control over the adjudicative process among roles, and on the generality of this relationship in the nations studied. sagemeta-type Journal Article search-text Reactions to Procedural Models for Adjudicative Conflict Resolution A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY E. ALLAN LIND Department of Psychology. University of New Hampshire BONNIE E. ERICKSON Center for the Study of Aging and Human Development, Duke University NEHEMIA FRIEDLAND University of TeI Aviv MICHAEL DICKENBERGER Lehrstuhl fur Soczialpsychologie. Universiry o Mannheinr f A cross-national experimental study examining perceptions of four procedural models for adjudicative conflict resolution was conducted in four countries-the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany-whose legal procedures are based on differing adjudicative models. One hundred seventy-eight subjects rated the four models ona number of dimensions, including their preference for using the model for settlinga conflict, the fairness of the model, and the amount of control over the resolution 01 the conflict vested in each of several roles. Approximately half of the subjects at each site were asked to assume the role of defendant in theadjudicated conflict, and halfwereasked toassume the role of plaintiff. The results showed a general preference for more“ adversary”(disputan1controlled) models over more ‘ inquisitorial“ (adjudicator-controlled) models. This preference was nor limited t o subjects from nations (the United States and Britain) whose legal systems are based on adversary models. The conclusions of the study focused on the relationship between subjects' model preferences and the distribution of control over the adjudicative process among roles, and on the generality of this relationship in the nations studied. Adjudication, the resolution of conflict through the bindingjudgment of a n impartial decision maker, is a common technique for the settlement of interpersonal and intergroup disputes. Adjudications may A U T H O R S N O T E The authors wish t o express their gratitude t o a number of individuals and institutions for their assistance in completing this study. Funding for the experiment was provided by the U S. National Science Foundation Grant GS-28590X, 0 1978 Sage Publications. Inc. 318 JOURNAL O F CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 22 No. 2, June 1978 find C-I al. 1 ADJUDICATIVE CONFLtCT RESOLUTtON 319 occur in a variety of settings, but perhaps the most salient examples of this form of conflict resolution are the decisions rendered by law courts. Although adjudication was long neglected as a topic of study in social science research on conflict resolution, recent years have seen a considerable expansion of the research literature concerning this technique for resolving disputes. Investigators have shown increasing interest both in examining the relation of adjudication to other forms of conflict resolution (e.g., La Tour et al., 1976a, b) and in identifyingspecific social processes influencing the behavior and perceptions of those involved in adjudications (e.g., Lind, 1975; Thibaut et al., 1972; Walker et a]., 1974). One approach to the study of adjudication has been the experimental investigation of the effects of various procedures which might be used in adjudications (Thibaut et al., 1974; Walker et al., 1974). An overall dimension of procedural variation is the “ procedural model” specified for the adjudication-the structuring principle of the conflict resolving group. Legal scholars have engaged in much debate and speculative discussion regarding the relative merits of various procedural models (e.g., Adams, 1973; Ehrenzweig, 1971). Although the distinctions among various extant and ideal procedural models have been made in terms of variables familiar to social scientists (e.g., the presence or absence of particular roles in the adjudicative group and the permitted information and outcome dependence among various roles), systematic empirical studies of procedural models have begun only recently (see Thibaut and Walker, 1975, for a presentation of some of the studies on this topic). These studies have produced considerable information of value to the understanding of adjudicative conflict resolution. However, one disadvantage of this research is that virtually all of these investigations have been conducted in one country, the United States, using “ Human Behavior and the Legal Process, ” John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, coprincipal investigators. Professors Thibaut and Walker also contributed greatly t o the study from its beginning through their many helpful comments and suggestions. The Paris replication was aided by Professor Serge Moscovici, Elizabeth Lage, and the Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. Michel Hagege translated the materials into French and conducted the French experiment. In Cambridge, the study was undertaken with the assistance of David Farrington, Nigel Walker and the Institute of Criminology, Cambridge University. The Mannheim replication benefited from the facilities of the Fakultat fur Sozialwissenschaften, Universitat hlannheim and the aid of Professor Martin Me. In Chapel Hill the facilities of the University of North Carolina Department of Psychology were used. The first author held a Foreign Area Fellowship from the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies at the time the research was conducted. The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and are not necessarily endorsed by any of these individuals o r institutions. Requests for reprints should be addressed to Allan Lind, Federal Judicial Center, 1520 H Street, Washington, D.C. 20005. 320 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION Decision moker Plaintiff Plaintiff a1 Inquisitorial model Defendant Plalntlfl Defendant Plaintiff Defendact 3)Single investigotar model c1Double investigator model dl Adversary model 5 I indicates relation “ communicates with” indicates relation “ outcomes aligned with” Figure 1: Four Procedural Models for Adjudication experimental subjects who are, in all probability, aware that their national legal system is based on one particular procedural model, the adversary model. The present study sought to remedy this situation by examining reactions to a variety of procedural ‘models among individuals from several nations, including some nations that endorse procedural models other than the adversary. The four procedural models examined in the present study are termed the “ inquisitorial, ” “ single investigator, ” “ double investigator, ” and “ adversary” models (see Figure I). These four models were chosen for examination because they represent different points on a conceptual continuum of systemic “ adversariness, ” a dimension which has been of much concern to legal theorists and lawmakers (e.g., Fuller, 1961) and which is related to national differences in legal procedures. At one end of this dimension is the adversary model (Figure Id), an avowed goal of many specific procedures in American and British courts (cf. Cound et al., 1974). The adversary model permits each disputant in the conflict to exercise a great deal of control over the substance of the adjudicative hearing through the actions of his attorney, whom the disputant has chosen to be responsible for advancing his interests. In the adversary model the role of the adjudicative decision maker is essentially passive. It is the adversary attorneys (not the decision maker) who investigate the case in conflict, and it is the attorneys who control the flow of information to the decision maker in an effort to secure a decision favorable to the disputant with whom their outcomes are aligned. At the other end of the continuum is the inquisitorial model (Figure la). Lind el al. 1 ADJUDICATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION 321 The inquisitorial model is characterized primarily by the fact that control over most of the substance of the adjudicative hearing lies in the hands of the legal decision maker. The inquisitorial decision maker himself accumulates information during the hearing of the conflict through personal interrogation of the disputants and witnesses. Between these two extremes lie the single and double investigator models (Figures l b and lc). In these two procedural models one, or two, court-aligned investigators accumulate evidence about the dispute and, during the hearing of the case, relay this information t o the decision maker. Neither the decision maker nor the disputants has complete control over the substance of the hearing. Of these two models, the double investigator may be supposed to be the more adversary, since the assignment of a different investigator to collect and present evidence for each disputant is a major element of the adversary model (cf. Thibaut et al., 1972). Although the procedural models examined in this study are best considered as “ pure types” constructed from conceptual variables relevant to adjudicative conflict resolution, there are important approximations of each model in natural conflict resolution settings. As noted above, the adversary model is the basis of American and British legal procedures. In contrast, the civil and criminal law of many of the nations of Continental Europe specifies the use of elements of both the inquisitorial and single investigator models.‘ For example, the presiding judge at a French legal hearing himself interrogates the disputants and witnesses to the case in order to supplement theinformation he obtains from an investigating official (Herzog, 1967; Pugh, 1962). A similar nonadversary procedure is used in the courts of West Germany, where the court and its agents conduct most of the factfinding investigations and interrogations (Kaplan et al., 1958). The rolerelations in the United States court-martial resemble to some extent those specified in the double investigator model, with the defense and prosecuting attorneys employed by the same organization which employs the decision maker (see Thibaut and Walker, 1975: ch. 4, for further discussion of these issues). The inquisitorial-to-adversary dimension along which the four procedural models range may be construed as a continuum defined by increasing control over the substance of the case by the disputants and I. Of course, parties to legal conflicts in these nations may have attorneys aligned with them, but these attorneys typically are not as deeply involved in the discovery and presentation of evidence as is the case in nations whose legal systems are structured according to the adversary model. 322 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION decreasing control by the decision maker. Thibaut and Walker (1975) have suggested that the perceived distribution of control between the decision maker and the disputants is a major determinant of the preference or satisfaction of the disputants with any particular procedural model. Specifically, Thibaut and Walker propose that models which are perceived t o be high in disputant control and low in decision maker control are seen as characterized by procedural fairness and that the perception of procedural fairness leads t o greater preference among disputants for using the model.* This proposition has been supported by a number of studies that have demonstrated, among American subjects, a general preference for more adversary (disputant controlled) over m6re inquisitorial (decision maker controlled) procedural models (La Tour, 1974; Thibaut et al., 1974; Walker et al., 1974). As noted above, however, all of the previous studies of disputant preferences for procedural models have used American subjects. It is possible that these subjects were responding favorably to the adversary model because they were more familiar with adversary procedures or because the adversary model receives extensive endorsement in the legal institutions of the United States, rather than because of some intrinsic positive characteristic of the model. Quite different patterns of preference might have been observed had the studies been conducted in Continental Europe, where societal prescriptions call for inquisitorial models. Lind (1974) found, for example, that French and American subjects differed in their reactions to adjudicator behavioral styles within an adversary model and suggested that at least some of these cross-national differences could be attributed t o different societal prescriptions for adjudicator behavior. The present study tested the generality of the Thibaut and Walker proposal relating preference to the distribution of control in procedural models. This was done byexamining preferences for the four procedural models in countries which endorse more inquisitorial models (France and West Germany) as well as in countries which endorse more adversary models of adjudication 2. In a recent article (Houlden et al., forthcoming) Thibaut and Walker make it clear that this statement applies to what they term “ process control”-control over the issues and evidence considered in the hearing. In high conflict situations such as those normally submitted to adjudication there often is, according to Thibaut and Wniker, a desire among disputants that “ decision control”-the control involved in specifying the final resolution of the conflict-be vested in the decision maker. This distinction between process and decision control is useful in explaining why previous studics (e.g., La Tour et al., 1976a; Thibaut et al., 1974) have found that most forms of adjudication are preferred tobargaining for the resolution of severe conflicts. The present paper is concerned mainly with process control. tind ei al. 1 ADJUDICATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION 323 (Britain and the United States). If the Thibaut and Walker proposal is generally correct, one would expect t o observe greater preferences in all four nations for more adversary models. On the other hand, if the apparent preference for more adversary models found in previous studies is largely a result of national endorsement of those models, one would expect the French and West German subjects to show greater preference for inquisitorial than for adversary models. Because previous research (Thibaut et al., 1974; Walker et al., 1974) had shown that a n individual' s expected position in an adjudicated conflict may influence his evaluation of procedural models, approximately half the subjects in each nation were asked t o evaluate the models from the perspective of the plaintiffs in a personal injury case, while the remaining subjects were asked t o adopt the perspective of the defendant in such a case. In an attempt to generate information not only about preferences for the models, but also about international similarities and differences in the psychological concomitants of these preferences, the subjects were asked both t o rate their preference for using each model and to rate each model on a number of dimensions which previous studies had shown to be important in describing the social characteristics of procedural models. METHOD SUBJECTS A N D SITES One hundred and seventy-eight subjects took part in the study. In the United States, 62 introductory psychology students participated in the study in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Forty French university students participated for monetary payment (four of these subjects did not complete the entire 'questionnaire and were therefore omitted from all analyses of the data). In West Germany, 30 university students and young professionals participated in the experiment. The British subjects were 46 university students., The study was conducted in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA; Paris, France; Cambridge, 3: It must be admitted that there is no reason to assume that the subject populations sampled were equivalent within the four nations or that any of the national samples was representative of any collection of individuals other than those willing t o participate in the study. At the three sites where social psychological studies are frequently conducted (Chapel Hill, Paris, and Mannheim). the subjects were representative of those used in other studies. 324 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION England; and Mannheim, West Germany. At each site approximately half the subjects were randomly assigned to the plaintiff role condition; and the remainder were assigned to the defendant role condition. PROCEDURE (The following procedure is that used in France. Essentially the same procedure was used at all four sites.) Subjects reported to the experiment one to four at a time. They were met by a native Frenchspeaking experimenter, shown to a library, and seated at some distance from each other. The experimenter gave each subject two booklets containing all the materials to be used in the experiment. The subjects' attention was directed to the first of these booklets, which contained a n instruction page, descriptions of the four procedural models, and a rating scale asking for the subject' s preferences among the four models. The experimenter asked the subjects to complete this booklet before continuing to the second booklet, which contained four pages of additional rating scales-one page for each of the models. The subjects were told to work through the two booklets at their own speed and were asked to return both booklets to the experimenter when they had finished. When all subjects had completed both booklets, the experimenter answered any questions concerning the study and paid the subjects for their participation in the experiment. MATERIALS The subjects received written instructions (including the manipulation of the role factor) on the first page of the experimental booklet. The instructions for subjects in the defendant role conditions were as follows: Imagine that you have been accused by another person of having wrongfully done injury t o him, of having harmed him with malicious intent. Suppose further that, as defendant, you have some choice in deciding how the issue will be resolved, i.e., which of several types of hearing procedures will be used to decide whether the chargesagainst youarejustified and hence whether you will have t o pay damages t o the plaintiff. Read over the following four types of hearing procedures and indicate your evaluations of them as ways of deciding whether the charges against you are justified. Each subject in the plaintiff role conditions was asked in a similar manner to assume that he had charged another with havingdone wrongful injury to him. Lind e i al. / ADJUDICATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION 325 DESIGN A N D ANALYSES OF THE STUDY The data of the study were analysed as a 4 (site) x 2 (plaintiff versus defendant role) x 4 (procedural model) complete factorial design with one within-subjects factor (i.e., the procedural model factor). To avoid the necessity of making assumptions concerning the equality of variancecovariance matrices, the analyses used multivariate analyses of variance of contrast scores generated from the within-subjects factor (Bock, 1975; Mc Call and Appelbaum, 1973). These contrast scores were based on pairwise contrasts of the procedural models adjacent on the inquisitorial-to-adversary dimension (i.e., inquisitorial versus single investigator, single investigator versus double investigator, and double investigator versus adversary). Analyses of covariance were used to provide“ stepdown” tests of each contrast in order to avoid any inflation of significance as a result of the nonindependence of these contrasts (see Bock, 1975: ch. 7). This technique of analysis permitted conservative testing of the general ANOVA effects and assessment, via the specific difference contrasts, of the locus of these general effects. All statistical analyses used least-squares solutions to assure accurary of the results in spite of the unequal number of subjects in various cells of the between-subjects design. RESULTS PREFERENCE RATINGS The results of the analysis of subjects' preference ratings of the four procedural models are presented in Table 1. Of the several significant effects observed on these ratings, the most striking is the main effect for the procedural model being rated. The marginal means for this effect, averaging across all sites and role conditions, are −4.91 for the inquisitorial model, −2.85 for the single investigator model, + 2.06for the double investigator model, and + 4.87 for the adversary model. (On the preference scale the endpoint “-9” was labeled: “ strongly prefer not to use this procedure” the midpoint “ 0”:“ no preference one way or the other” and the endpoint “+ Y‘: ” strongly prefer to use this procedure“.) The F-values of the specific contrasts (see Table 1) confirm the pattern of responses evident from the above means. In terms of the conceptual dimension of interest, within each contrast the more adversary model is significantly preferred to the more inquisitorial model. 326 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION Following these instructions were descriptions of the four procedural models discussed above. The models, labeled “ Hearing Procedures, ” were identified only with the letters A-D to avoid any evaluative implications of specific titles. The models were presented in completely neutral terms, using only a simple statement of the roles included in the model and of the relationships among these roles. For example, the following is the English text of “ Hearing Procedure C, ” the double investigator model. Hearing Procedure C (1) Decision Maker-Under this procedure a decision maker will in turn appoint two investigators. One investigator will be assigned to present facts favdrable to the plaintiff, the other, those facts favorable to the defendant. When the investigators have concluded their presentations, the decision maker will close the hearing, deliberate, and announce his decision. (2) Investigators or Representatives-Two investigators, appointed by decision maker, are assigned to obtain the facts of the case. One investigator is assigned to each disputant, but the investigators are representatives of the decision maker and not of either plaintiff or defendant. During the hearing the investigators may ask questions about the facts presented by the other investigator. (3) Disprrrarrts-Prior to the hearing plaintiff and defendant will furnish the facts requested by the investigator assigned to present their side of the case. After studying the four models, the subjects were asked to rate their preferences among the models. Preference ratings of the four models were made on a 19-point scale, with the constraint that no two models could receive exactly the same rating on this scale. The scales in the second booklet solicited ratings of the extent to which each model was perceived to favor the subject himself, and to favor his opponent; the opportunity of each party to present evidence; the fairness of each model; and the degree to which the decision maker, the subject himself, and the subject' s opponent were thought to have control over who won the dispute. The same English version of the experimental materials was used in Chapel Hill and Cambridge. For use in Paris and Mannheim the materials were translated by native French and German speakers and were back-translated to English to verify essential equivalence of meaning. Lind et a!. 1 ADJUDICATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION 327 TABLE 1 ANOVA of Preference Ratings of the Four Procedural Models Source Betiveeri-nrbjects Site (S) Role (R) d.f: F 1.75 1.88 1.0 SxR 3, 166 1, 166 3, 166 < Iilithbi-sfrbjectS Procedural hlodcl (hl) Single investigator vs. inquisitorial (B-A) Double investigator vs. single investigator (C-B) Adversary vs. Double investigator (D-C) 3, 164 1, 164 1, 164 1, 164 9, 399 3, 164 3, 164 3, 164 3, 164 1, 164 1, 164 1, 164 9.399 3, 164 3, 164 3, 164 96.80*** 16.84 *** 177.01*** 56.02*** 2.14** 3.39** 1.97 2.49 S x hi S x @-A) S x (C-B) S x (D-C) R x hl R R R x (B-A) X X (C-B) @-C) < 3.12* 3.20 1.0 3.71 S x R x.hl S x R x (B-A) S x R x (C-B) S x R x (D-C) p<.o5 p<.025 p<.oo5 < 1.0 < 1.0 < 1.0 < 1.0 * ** *** The significant site x model and role x model interactions are not due to any reversal of this general preference for more adversary models, but indicate instead local or role-specific variation in the relative difference between preferences for particular models. The site x model interaction, graphed in Figure 2, is the result of only a very slight preference for the single investigator over the inquisitorial model among British subjects and a more substantial difference in preferences for these two models among subjects at the other sites. (That this interactive effect is confined to ratings of the single investigator and inquisitorial models is indicated by the fact that only the contrast testing this portion of the interaction is significant; see Table 1). It should be noted that all subjects-including the British-much preferred the double investigator to the single investigator and inquisitorial models and preferred the adversary model to any of the other three. 328 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 9 s + 7 + + 6 - + 5 + 4 *=+ 2 er, c 0 + 3- a al 0 + I - = E 0) + 0-1- a-2E f ! 2 −4 −5 −7 −9-P -6 0 -3- t- 1 Chapel Hill, U.S.A. Cambridge, England-& Paris, France Q Mannheirn, West Germany Q * I I I I Inquisitorial Single Investigator Double Investigator Adversary Procedural Model Figure 2: Mean Preference Ratings of the Four Models at the Four Sites of Experimentation (Site x Model Interaction) The role x model interaction on preference ratings is graphed in Figure 3, which presents the mean preference ratings of the four models by plaintiff and defendant subjects. The pattern of means and the specific contrast tests indicate that this interaction is due to relatively greater preference by defendant than plaintiff subjects for the more adversary procedure in the single investigator versus inquisitorial and in the adversary versus double investigator model contrasts (although the contrast interactions fall just short of significance: F (1, 164)= 3.20, p <.08 and F(1, 164) = 3.71, p <.06, respectively). That is, although Lind el al. ADJUDICATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION 329 both plaintiff and defendant subjects preferred the single investigator to the inquisitorial model and the adversary to the double investigator model, this differential preference was more pronounced with defendant role subjects. The preference for the double investigator over the single investigator model was substantial and did not vary with the subjects' role. OTHER QUESTIONNAIRE ITEhIS In order to examine the subjects' perceptions of the characteristics of the four procedural models, responses to the eight items in the questionnaire booklet were subjected to analyses similar to that just reported for the preference ratings. Two other indices, generated from combinations of the questionnaire items, were also analyzed. One of these indices, labeled “ total control, ” was the sum of the subject' s ratings on the three questionnaire items assessing the degree to which the decision maker, the subject himself, and the subject' s opponent were perceived to control the outcome of the conflict. The second index, labeled “ percent decision maker control, ” was the decision maker control rating expressed as a percentage of the total control index. The results of these analyses are reported in Table 2. As indicated in Table 2, all ten dependent variables showed strong main effects for the procedural model factor. Marginal means for this main effect, averaging across sites and roles, are presented in Table 3. The subjects' ratings of the fairness of the model, the degree to which the model provided the subject and the subject' s opponent the opportunity to present evidence, and the degree to which the model favored the subject showed model main effects very similar to that observed on the preference ratings. That is, on each of these measures each pairwise specific contrast was significant, indicating that the subjects felt that the more adversary model in each pair exhibited these qualities to a greater extent than did the more inquisitorial model. The ratings of the decision maker' s control over the outcome of the conflict and the percentage index of this control dimension showed significant decreases across the inquisitorial-to-adversary dimension: for each pairwise contrast the more inquisitorial model was seen as involving more decision maker control. The remaining four measures (ratings of the subject' s and his opponent' s control over the outcome, ratings of the degree to which the model favored the opponent, and the total control index) showed either no increase in or a significant decrease between the inquisitorial and single investigator models and 330 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION + 5 + 6 + 4 + 7 + 95 - - g+ 3.0+ 2- a t :+ I c . c t? Q) 0- Q. 2-1 c 0-2 a l - =-3 -4 Q -5 −6-. 75-91 Inquisitorial 1 * Defendant-role subjects Plaintiff-role subjects Single I Double I Adversary 1 Procedural Model Figure 3: Mean Preference Ratings of the Four Models by Defendant and Plaintiff Role Subjects (Role x Model Interaction) significant increases along the remainder of the inquisitorial-toadversary dimension. Significant site x model interactions were observed on two of the ten dependent variables under consideration (see Table 2). The interaction on ratings of the fairness of the models seems to be due to the fact that the American and West German subjects rated the adversary model as substantially more fair than the double investigator model, while the French and British subjects gave nearly equivalent fairness ratings to these two models (F(3, 164) = 2.55, p <.058 for the specific contrast ANOVAs of Subjects' Responses t o Questionnaire Items and Indices Soirrce TABLE 2 Bcrrveeri-sirbjects IVitliiti-sir bjects Site(S) Role(Rj SxR Model(Af) 55.95**' 73.72** 35.14** 36.38** 8 1.4 1 ** 65.78** 49.98** 35.73** 23.24** 58.33** 3, 164 Sx Al Rx Af air akcr controls conflict resolution ntrols conflict resolution controls conflict rcsolution pportunity to prcscnt cvidcncc s opportunity to prcscnt cvidcncc ors subject ors opponcnt trolb dccisionmakcr controlb frccdom 1.15a 2.12 2.90* 4.28** 1.80 1.77 4.62** 3.02* 3, 166 – – 1.44 L- __- 1.27 _- 1.80 1.06 — ___ 5.80* — —- ___ 3, 166 1, 166 2.01* 1.37 1.37 1.75 1.80 1.89 1.80 1.58 2.20* 1.33 9, 399 – 1.29 1.50 2.50 2.85* 1.07 1.61 2.06 3, 164 __ __ ntcrcd in tablc arc I ratios. No valuc is cntcrcd whcn thc 1 is lcss than 1.0.: t for cxplanation of this indcx. 332 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION hlarginal hleans for hlain Effect of Procedural hlodel on Questionnaire Items Procedural Model Item hlodel is fair Decisionmaker controls conflict resolution Subject controls conflict resolution Opponent controls conflict resolution Subject' s opportunity to present cvidcnce Opponent' s opportunity to present evidence hlodel favors subject hlodcl favors opponent Total control3 Perccntagc decisionmaker controla Inqii isitorial TABLE 3 Single Iiivestigator 4.16 10.40 4.72 5.05 Doiible Investigator 5.18 Adver. sary 6.33 8.62 1.56 1.93 7.10 6.93 5.63 5.57 3.33* 12.74** 5.03** 5.84** 3.93* 4.31* 4.12* 4.61* 23.60 56.84 9.65 6.06 6.23 5.88 4.32 4.41 4.54 4.40 20.18 52.35 5.12 4.88 4.68 2 1.94 45.51 24.1 1 36.61 a. See test for esplanation of this indes. * ltcm rated on nine-point scale; higher valucs indicate ratings in the direction named. ** Item rated on 15-point scale; “ 1” = “ too little, ” “ 8” = “ right amount, ” “ 15”= “ too much.” interaction testing this locus of the overall interaction). A site x model interaction was also observed on the total control index. While subjects at all four sites felt that the total control of three primary roles in the adjudication was less in the single investigator than in the inquisitorial model, this difference was most strongly evident for the British subjects (although the specific contrast interaction is not strictly significant; F(3, 164) = 2.17, p <.lo). A significant role x model interaction was observed on the ratings of the degree to which each model would favor the subject himself. Specific contrast tests within this interaction revealed that defendant role subjects, to a greater degree than plaintiff role subjects, felt they would be more favored by the single investigator than the inquisitorial model(F(1, 164)=4.38, p<.04)and more favored bytheadversarythan thedoubleinvestigatormodel(F(1, 164)= 5.27, p <.03). Thisis thesame Lind er al. 1 ADJUDICATiVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION 333 interaction pattern as that revealed by the role x model interaction on the preference ratings. The two scales assessing perceptions of disputant control (i.e., those asking the degree to which the subject and his opponent would control the outcome of the case) showed site main effects, ‘Higher ratings of disputant control were observed for the French subjects than for the subjects at the other three sites. (These effects in turn produced site main effects on the percent decision maker control and total control indices, which were based in part on these control ratings.) Finally, a significant main effect for the role factor revealed that defendant role subjects more than plaintiff role subjects thought that all four models would favor the subject' s opponent. OTHER ANALYSES Because a major goal of this study was to determine which characteristics of the models were most closely associated with differential preferences, additional analyses were conducted to aid in this aspect of the interpretation of the results. “ Pattern scores‘*-an index of association used by Thibaut et al. (1974) and Thibaut and Walker (1975)were computed for each subject. These pattern scores indicate the degree to which a particular subject' s response to the questionnaire items showed the same pattern across the four models as did his preference ratings. As is the case with traditional, between-subject correlations, the absolute magnitude of the pattern score indicates the strength of the relation between the preference scale and the questionnaire scale, while the sign of the pattern score indicates whether the relation is direct or inverse? 4. The correlations o n which these pattern scores were based were not computed in the traditional manner across subjects. Instead a correlation coefficient was calculated for each subject across the four procedural models to represent the degree t o which his preference ratings were linearly related t o his ratings o n a questionnaire item. Because the distribution of correlation coefficients is non-normal, these within-subject correlation scores were transformed using the following formula, where r is the subject' s correlation score: pattern score 1/2 log. ((l t r) / (I-r)). Thus, if a particular subject' s ratings of the fairness of the four models correlated.85 with his preference ratings, the resulting pattern score would be: 1.256 = 1/2 log, ((It.85) / (1-35)). Unlike traditional correlation coefficients, pattern scores can have absoluteralues greater than 1.0. Pattern scores have the advantage, not found in traditional correlation coefficients, of permitting easy analysis of intersubject differences in the relationship between two scales. 334 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION TABLE 4 hlean Pattern Scores Relating Preference Ratings and Questionnaire Items Site Chapel Hill, USA. 1.58a Item hlodel is fair Decisionmaker controls conflict resolution Subject controls conflict resolution Opponent controls conflict resolution Subject' s opportunity t o prescnt evidence Opponent' s opportunity t o prcscnt evidence Cambridge, Paris, England Frarice IV. Geriiiaiiy 1.95-.95 1.46 1.36 1.10 .6 1 Alariiiheini, 1.40-.34 1.16.75 1.14 1.oo 1.12 -.85 -1.25 1.02 .8S .74.20 1.33.99 1.35 1.37 a. See text and note 4 for an explanation of this index. In order to assess the effects of the role and site factors on concomitants of the prefrence ratings, these pattern scores were submitted to analyses of variance. Table 4 shows the mean pattern scores relating the preference ratings to selected questionnaire ratings at each site of experimentation. The pattern scores reported here were chosen for presentation because of their relevance to previous thought about procedural preferences (e.g., Thibaut and Walker, 1975), or because they showed interesting international differences. Congruent with the Thibaut and Walker contention that the perception of procedural fairness leads to greater preference for a procedural model, all four sites showed high positive pattern scores relating the preference and fairness ratings of the models. Although there was a significant site main effect on these pattern scores (F(3, 166) 4. 0 9p <, . Ol), at three of the four sites (i.e., for the American, British, and German subjects) the fairness pattern score mean was the highest ofany pattern score mean computed.' 5. When the results indicate a difference between the responses of French and/or German subjects and the responses of American and British subjects, it is possible that some aspect of the translation of materials and response scales into the subjects' language is responsible for the finding. For example, the relatively lower fairness pattern score mean for the French subjects may be related to connotative differences between the English term “ fair” and the French term“ equitable, ” rather than to differences in the psychological concomitants of preference. Although the translation process was carefully checked, there is no completely adequate technique for avoiding such problems in cross-national research involving the translation of materials. find el al. 1 ADJUDICATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION 335 It should be noted that only the pattern scores using the ratings of decision maker control were negative, indicating that only this rating dimension showed an inverse relationship with the preference ratings. It is also noteworthy that the pattern scores relating the model preferences with the subjects' ratings of their own control over the conflict resolution and with the subjects' ratings of their own opportunity to present evidence were universally high and did not exhibit significant betweensite variation (F(3, 166) = 1.96, n.s., and F(3, 166) <.1.0 for the two dimensions, respectively). Site main effects were observed on three sets of pattern scores in addition to those pertaining t o the fairness-preference relationship. The British subjects' preference ratings appear t o be less closely related to their perceptions of decision maker control than was the case with the American, French, and German subjects (F(3, 166)=6.05, p<.001). On the pattern scores relating model preferences to perceptions of the opponent' s control, the relatively low mean of the French subjects seems to be responsible for the site main effect (F(3, 166) = 6.10, p <.001). Finally, on the pattern scores relating the preference ratings to ratings of the opponent' s opportunity to present evidence, the mean of the German subjects was distinctively lower than the mean of th;: other subjects (03, 166) = 4.67, p <.01). DISCUSSION The most striking effect observed in the present study was the tendency of subjects at all four sites and in both role conditions to order the four procedural models, on a number of dependent variables, as the models are ordered on the theoretical inquisitorial-to-adversary dimension. That this ordering was observed on the subjects' preference ratings, with only minor variations in mean values among the four sites of experimentation, provides considerable evidence that there is some quality of more adversary procedures that is generally desired. This general preference for more adversarial procedural models, even among subjects whose own legal systems are based on inquisitorial models, indicates that model preferences are not due primarily to such factors as familiarity or national endorsement of particular models. The analyses of the questionnaire items and their pattern scores with the preference ratings suggest a cluster of variables which may be important in explaining the preference results obtained. (It must be noted, however, that the pattern scores like any correlational index can only suggest, but never confirm, causal relationships.) 336 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION We noted earlier that the questionnaire items concerning the subjects' perceptions of fairness and their perceptions of their own influence capacity over the adjudicative process (i.e., the ratings of their own opportunity to present evidence and of their own control over theresolution of the conflict) exhibited strong positive pattern scores with the preference ratings. The close relationships between these three questionnaire items and the preference ratings are congruent with the Thibaut and Walker (1975) suggestion that procedures that induce perceptions of high disputant control over the conflict resolution process lead to perceptions of fairness and to the preference for and satisfaction with the procedure. It is particularly noteworthy that perceived personal control was closely related to model preferences not only in the United States and Great Britain; but also in France and West Germany, where inquisitorial, decision maker-controlled procedures are more common. This leads us to believe that there exists (at least in Western societies) a general desire for high personal control over the adjudicative process; a desire which is not dependent on the societal specification of models designed to maximize this variable. In light of the apparent importance of perceptions of personal control in determining preferences for models of adjudication, it is interesting to note that related variables have been shown to have considerable influence on the reactions of individuals to a variety of situations other than adjudication. For example, recent studies by Glass and Singer (1972) on the effects of environmental stressors have indicated that the provision of mechanisms which are alleged to render the stressor controllable by a subject results in the reduction of negative aftereffects of the stressor (see also Schulz, 1976). Similarly, it is a common finding in studies which have assessed reactions to communication networks that subjects are more satisfied with more central positions in the networks than with peripheral positions (see Collins and Raven, 1969, for a review of these studies). Central positions incommunication networks certainly involve more actual control over the group' s goal attainment and it seems likely that subjects recognize this. That variables related to the perception of personal control over outcomes are associated with positive reactions to situations as diverse as these, together with the absence in the present study of any national differences in the relationship between such perceptions and preferences among adjudicative models, suggests that perceived personal control is a variable of major importance and of great generality in the understanding of reactions to social structures and events. Our previous remarks about cross-national similarities in reactions to the procedural models notwithstanding, the significant site x model Lind et al. 1 ADJUDICATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION 337 interaction on the preference ratings shows that there were some differences among subjects in different nations in their evaluations of the models. It will be recalled that this interaction was due to the British subjects showing less preference for the single investigator model over the inquisitorial model than was the case for subjects at the other three sites. We propose, however, that this finding can also be explained by control considerations; although it is necessary to expand our theoretical examination to include the control perceived to be vested in other roles in the adjudicative group. Thibaut and Walker have suggested recently (Houlden et al., fothcoming) that the desire of disputants for high control over the adjudicative process is the result of the perception that there is greater likelihood that the particular facts in the case under adjudication will be presented if there is high disputant control and low decision maker control. High disputant control is thought to be associated with consideration of the particular circumstances in the case and with consideration of the relation of these circumstances to concepts of distributive justice or equity (cf. Adams, 1965; Homans, 1961). High decision maker control, on the other hand, is thought to be associated with a more “ legalistic” conflict resolution process which may neglect the particulars of the case. If the British subjects, more than the subjects in the other three nations, saw the single investigator model as involving the transfer of control to the investigative official, and if the British subjects thought that this official would focus on legalistic rather than equity concerns, their reactions to the inquisitorial and single investigator models can be explained. There is little reason to prefer a powerful investigator to a powerful judge if one believes that neither will focus on the particular circumstances of the case. Although it is not possible with the present data to test the proposition that the British subjects saw the single investigator as oriented toward legalistic concerns, there is some evidence that the transfer of control to the investigator was especially salient to the British subjects. Specifically, the site x model interaction on the total control index revealed that, more than the subjects at the other three sites, the British saw the single investigator model as leading to less control by thedecision maker and the disputants than did the inquisitorial model. The role x-model interaction on the preference ratings, due to the somewhat greater preference of defendant subjects than of plainiff subjects for more adversary models, may also be explained in terms of the distribution of control over the adjudicative process and the implicatioris of this control for the presentation of the particulaccircum- 338 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION stances in the case. More commonly than plaintiffs, defendants in personal injury cases (such as that used in the present study) base their evidence and arguments on protestations that the particular facts in the case d o not fit the legal rules under which the suit is brought. Subjects in the defendant role thus may have more strongly preferred more adversary models because they feared that these important particulars of the case would not emerge under more decision makercontrolled, inquisitorial models. This is not to say that the presentation of the particular circumstances of the case would be unimportant to plaintiffs; this issue is assumed simply to be of even greater concern to defendants. Some limitations of the present study require comment. The subjects at all four sites were for the most part university students and were, of course, not entirely representative of the national populations from which they were drawn. Since the major purpose of the study was to provide a test of the control distribution hypothesis against the hypothesis that previous findings had resulted from national endorsement and familiarity with particular models, this nonrepresentativeness was not considered a serious problem. It was assumed that university students in each nation would be well aware ofthe proceduralmodelcharacteristicsof their nation' s legal system, and would thus provide an adequate opportunity to test these hypotheses. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that several recent studies using different subject groups have replicated the finding that procedures are more preferred when disputant control is high and decision maker control over the adjudicative process is low. These studies include an experiment by Houlden et al. (forthcoming) using undergraduate students, law students, and military judges as subjects and an experiment by La Tour et al. (1976b) using German and American undergraduate and law students. Another study asked posttrial prisoners in an American military prison to judge a number of procedural models in a fashion much like that used in the present study and produced results very similar to those presented here.6 A second limitation of the present study is that the subjects were asked to role-play defendants and plaintiffs in a conflict and did not, of course, actually expect to make use of the procedural models they evaluated. It is possible that their reactions would have been different had they actually.been involved in a conflict resolution situation. The method used here was chosen because of its practicality and economy of use at the several sites of experimentation. However, 6. The authors are grateful to Susan T. KUIIZ and John Thibaut for providing information on this as yet unpublished study. Lind er a!. / ADJUDICATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION 339 this limitation may be at least partially discounted in view of the fact that the results reported here are very similar to those obtained in a number of studies in which subjects in actual conflict resolution situations evaluated these or similar procedural models (e.g., La Tour et al., 1976b; La Tour, 1974; Thibaut et al., 1974; Walker et al., 1974). Finally, it is important to note that the present study was designed to test the generality of previous empirical findings and the theoretical proposals advanced to explain those findings. Any application of the above results to policy evaluations of actual adjudicative procedures is hazardous not only because of the usual problems attending the generalization of laboratory results to other situations, but also because there are many factors other than disputant preference (e.g., judicial accuracy, efficiency, and economy) which must be considered in such evaluations. The primary value of this study resides in its confirmation of the importance of control relationships in determining reactions to adjudicative conflict resolution and in the demonstration that this psychological process seems to transcend national boundaries. The present data have permitted us to make some suggestions about similarities and differences between nations in the perception of procedural justice. There remains, of course, considerable need for further studies of this topic. It is desirable, for example, to extend the study of adjudication to include other subject populations and to examine adjudicative situations which more closely approximate the complex contexts of formal adjudications. Further, if preference for procedures is indeed the result of perceptions about the distribution of control and the implications of these control perceptions for equity versus legalistic considerations, additional research may show that preferences for adversary models might be decreased if for some reason disputants feel a loss of control or perceive that the adversary adjudication is taking a more legalistic orientation than they desire. Similarly, it may be found that inquisitorial models may be rendered more acceptable if they include somesalient, standard provision for disputant input concerning the particular circumstances of the case. In any event, it is from such further study that a greater understanding of procedural justice will be achieved and that suggestions may be offered with confidence concerning the likelihood that existing procedures will provide equitable and satisfactory outcomes from interpersonal and intergroup conflicts.
PY - 1978/6
Y1 - 1978/6
N2 - A cross-national experimental study examining perceptions of four procedural models for adjudicative conflict resolution was conducted in four countries—the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany—whose legal procedures are based on differing adjudicative models. One hundred seventy-eight subjects rated the four models on a number of dimensions, including their preference for using the model for settling a conflict, the fairness of the model, and the amount of control over the resolution of the conflict vested in each of several roles. Approximately half of the subjects at each site were asked to assume the role of defendant in the adjudicated conflict, and half were asked to assume the role of plaintiff. The results showed a general preference for more “adversary” (disputant-controlled) models over more “inquisitorial” (adjudicator-controlled) models. This preference was not limited to subjects from nations (the United States and Britain) whose legal systems are based on adversary models. The conclusions of the study focused on the relationship between subjects' model preferences and the distribution of control over the adjudicative process among roles, and on the generality of this relationship in the nations studied.
AB - A cross-national experimental study examining perceptions of four procedural models for adjudicative conflict resolution was conducted in four countries—the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany—whose legal procedures are based on differing adjudicative models. One hundred seventy-eight subjects rated the four models on a number of dimensions, including their preference for using the model for settling a conflict, the fairness of the model, and the amount of control over the resolution of the conflict vested in each of several roles. Approximately half of the subjects at each site were asked to assume the role of defendant in the adjudicated conflict, and half were asked to assume the role of plaintiff. The results showed a general preference for more “adversary” (disputant-controlled) models over more “inquisitorial” (adjudicator-controlled) models. This preference was not limited to subjects from nations (the United States and Britain) whose legal systems are based on adversary models. The conclusions of the study focused on the relationship between subjects' model preferences and the distribution of control over the adjudicative process among roles, and on the generality of this relationship in the nations studied.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84972730366&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/002200277802200207
DO - 10.1177/002200277802200207
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AN - SCOPUS:84972730366
SN - 0022-0027
VL - 22
SP - 318
EP - 339
JO - Journal of Conflict Resolution
JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution
IS - 2