Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: Between nash and rationalizability

Ariel Rubinstein, Asher Wolinsky

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Static equilibria can be viewed as steady states of recurring play of a game. Such steady states in which players do not perfectly observe the actions of others need not be Nash equilibria. This paper suggests a static solution concept, rationalizable conjectural equilibrium, that corresponds to such steady states. To present it, the basic model of a normal form game is enriched by specifying the signals that players get about others′ actions. The solution is a profile of actions such that each player′s action is optimal given that it is common knowledge that all players maximize utility given their signals. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number C72.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)299-311
Number of pages13
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
StatePublished - Mar 1994


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