TY - JOUR
T1 - Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium
T2 - Between nash and rationalizability
AU - Rubinstein, Ariel
AU - Wolinsky, Asher
PY - 1994/3
Y1 - 1994/3
N2 - Static equilibria can be viewed as steady states of recurring play of a game. Such steady states in which players do not perfectly observe the actions of others need not be Nash equilibria. This paper suggests a static solution concept, rationalizable conjectural equilibrium, that corresponds to such steady states. To present it, the basic model of a normal form game is enriched by specifying the signals that players get about others′ actions. The solution is a profile of actions such that each player′s action is optimal given that it is common knowledge that all players maximize utility given their signals. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number C72.
AB - Static equilibria can be viewed as steady states of recurring play of a game. Such steady states in which players do not perfectly observe the actions of others need not be Nash equilibria. This paper suggests a static solution concept, rationalizable conjectural equilibrium, that corresponds to such steady states. To present it, the basic model of a normal form game is enriched by specifying the signals that players get about others′ actions. The solution is a profile of actions such that each player′s action is optimal given that it is common knowledge that all players maximize utility given their signals. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number C72.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0000438277&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1006/game.1994.1016
DO - 10.1006/game.1994.1016
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AN - SCOPUS:0000438277
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 6
SP - 299
EP - 311
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 2
ER -