Rational joining behavior in a queueing system with abandonments

Michal Benelli, Refael Hassin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We consider individually and socially-optimal joining behavior in a first-come first-served M/M/1 queueing system where a customer's need for service may expire after an exponentially distributed length of time. We show that the individual behavior is independent of the rate of abandonment. We use the fact that the individual behavior in a last-come first-served M/M/1 queue is socially-optimal to compute the socially-optimal threshold.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)426-430
Number of pages5
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume49
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2021

Keywords

  • Nash equilibria
  • Social optimization
  • Strategic queueing

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