Rational joining behavior in a queueing system with abandonments

Michal Benelli; Refael Hassin

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2021.04.004

Rational joining behavior in a queueing system with abandonments

Michal Benelli^*, Refael Hassin

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider individually and socially-optimal joining behavior in a first-come first-served M/M/1 queueing system where a customer's need for service may expire after an exponentially distributed length of time. We show that the individual behavior is independent of the rate of abandonment. We use the fact that the individual behavior in a last-come first-served M/M/1 queue is socially-optimal to compute the socially-optimal threshold.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	426-430
Number of pages	5
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	49
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2021.04.004
State	Published - May 2021

Keywords

Nash equilibria
Social optimization
Strategic queueing

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10.1016/j.orl.2021.04.004

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KW - Strategic queueing

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Rational joining behavior in a queueing system with abandonments

Abstract

Keywords

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