Pricing multi-unit markets

Tomer Ezra; Michal Feldman; Tim Roughgarden; Warut Suksompong

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_10

Pricing multi-unit markets

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Stanford University

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the power and limitations of posted prices in multi-unit markets, where agents arrive sequentially in an arbitrary order. We prove upper and lower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be guaranteed with posted prices, under a range of assumptions about the designer’s information and agents’ valuations. Our results provide insights about the relative power of uniform and non-uniform prices, the relative difficulty of different valuation classes, and the implications of different informational assumptions. Among other results, we prove constant-factor guarantees for agents with (symmetric) subadditive valuations, even in an incomplete-information setting and with uniform prices.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Web and Internet Economics - 14th International Conference, WINE 2018, Proceedings
Editors	Tobias Harks, George Christodoulou
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	140-153
Number of pages	14
ISBN (Print)	9783030046118
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_10
State	Published - 2018
Event	14th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom Duration: 15 Dec 2018 → 17 Dec 2018

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	11316 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	14th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2018
Country/Territory	United Kingdom
City	Oxford
Period	15/12/18 → 17/12/18

Funding

Funders	Funder number
Seventh Framework Programme	337122

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_10

Cite this

Ezra, T., Feldman, M., Roughgarden, T., & Suksompong, W. (2018). Pricing multi-unit markets. In T. Harks, & G. Christodoulou (Eds.), Web and Internet Economics - 14th International Conference, WINE 2018, Proceedings (pp. 140-153). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11316 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_10

Ezra, Tomer ; Feldman, Michal ; Roughgarden, Tim et al. / Pricing multi-unit markets. Web and Internet Economics - 14th International Conference, WINE 2018, Proceedings. editor / Tobias Harks ; George Christodoulou. Springer Verlag, 2018. pp. 140-153 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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author = "Tomer Ezra and Michal Feldman and Tim Roughgarden and Warut Suksompong",

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Ezra, T, Feldman, M, Roughgarden, T & Suksompong, W 2018, Pricing multi-unit markets. in T Harks & G Christodoulou (eds), Web and Internet Economics - 14th International Conference, WINE 2018, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 11316 LNCS, Springer Verlag, pp. 140-153, 14th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2018, Oxford, United Kingdom, 15/12/18. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_10

Pricing multi-unit markets. / Ezra, Tomer; Feldman, Michal; Roughgarden, Tim et al.
Web and Internet Economics - 14th International Conference, WINE 2018, Proceedings. ed. / Tobias Harks; George Christodoulou. Springer Verlag, 2018. p. 140-153 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11316 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Ezra T, Feldman M, Roughgarden T, Suksompong W. Pricing multi-unit markets. In Harks T, Christodoulou G, editors, Web and Internet Economics - 14th International Conference, WINE 2018, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2018. p. 140-153. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_10

Pricing multi-unit markets

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