Prejudices of Opinions

Joseph Agassi*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review


Francis Bacon is the originator of the demand to suspend judgment about a given theory first and then to commit oneself to it only to the degree to which extant evidence supports it, to the degree of belief in it that is rational given available empirical information. This demand is very widespread and deserves special attention. Before showing that it goes back to Bacon and before explaining why he and his followers were and still are its ardent advocates despite all the criticism that diverse critics have leveled against it, let me discuss the view itself no matter who may have been its originator. The best argument in favor of this theory that I have found is in Russell’s charming Skeptical Essays of 1928. His presentation of his view is a part of his introduction:.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationBoston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science
PublisherSpringer Nature
Number of pages28
StatePublished - 2013

Publication series

NameBoston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science
ISSN (Print)0068-0346
ISSN (Electronic)2214-7942


  • Extant Evidence
  • Mechanical Philosophy
  • Proper Induction
  • Rational Degree
  • Receive Opinion


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