TY - JOUR
T1 - Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs
AU - Eliaz, Kfir
AU - Spiegler, Ran
AU - Thysen, Heidi C.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Elsevier B.V.
Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2021/5
Y1 - 2021/5
N2 - We study a two-action, two-state pure persuasion game in which the receiver has non-rational expectations. The sender can add ambiguity to his message by pooling it with other messages. This can be likened to selective redaction of the original message. The receiver knows the sender's message strategy but not his redaction strategy, and uses only the former to draw inferences from the redacted message. We characterize the highest probability of persuasion attainable by the sender under these conditions.
AB - We study a two-action, two-state pure persuasion game in which the receiver has non-rational expectations. The sender can add ambiguity to his message by pooling it with other messages. This can be likened to selective redaction of the original message. The receiver knows the sender's message strategy but not his redaction strategy, and uses only the former to draw inferences from the redacted message. We characterize the highest probability of persuasion attainable by the sender under these conditions.
KW - Misspecified beliefs
KW - Non-rational expectations
KW - Persuasion
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85102825523&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103712
DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103712
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AN - SCOPUS:85102825523
SN - 0014-2921
VL - 134
JO - European Economic Review
JF - European Economic Review
M1 - 103712
ER -