@article{482e9fbe09c244079a6985ec8c24ebab,
title = "Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs",
abstract = "We study a two-action, two-state pure persuasion game in which the receiver has non-rational expectations. The sender can add ambiguity to his message by pooling it with other messages. This can be likened to selective redaction of the original message. The receiver knows the sender's message strategy but not his redaction strategy, and uses only the former to draw inferences from the redacted message. We characterize the highest probability of persuasion attainable by the sender under these conditions.",
keywords = "Misspecified beliefs, Non-rational expectations, Persuasion",
author = "Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler and Thysen, {Heidi C.}",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 Elsevier B.V. Copyright: Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",
year = "2021",
month = may,
doi = "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103712",
language = "אנגלית",
volume = "134",
journal = "European Economic Review",
issn = "0014-2921",
publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",
}