Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs

Kfir Eliaz*, Ran Spiegler, Heidi C. Thysen

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study a two-action, two-state pure persuasion game in which the receiver has non-rational expectations. The sender can add ambiguity to his message by pooling it with other messages. This can be likened to selective redaction of the original message. The receiver knows the sender's message strategy but not his redaction strategy, and uses only the former to draw inferences from the redacted message. We characterize the highest probability of persuasion attainable by the sender under these conditions.

Original languageEnglish
Article number103712
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume134
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2021

Funding

FundersFunder number
Engineering Research Centers692995
Israel Science Foundation470/19
Economic and Social Research Council1779091

    Keywords

    • Misspecified beliefs
    • Non-rational expectations
    • Persuasion

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