Peer disagreement and counter-examples

Ruth Weintraub*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Two kinds of considerations are thought to be relevant to the correct response to the discovery of a peer who disagrees with you about some question. The first is general principles pertaining to disagreement. According to the second kind of consideration, a theory about the correct response to peer disagreement must conform to our intuitions about test cases. In this paper, I argue against the assumption that imperfect conformity to our intuitions about test cases must count against a theory about peer disagreement, offer a principled way of (sometimes) shrugging off a theory’s failure to deliver the intuitive verdict, and consider the main extant theories from the new methodological perspective.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1773-1790
Number of pages18
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number7
StatePublished - 1 Jul 2020


  • Conciliationism
  • Peer disagreement
  • Test-cases


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