Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium

Eddie Dekel*, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

48 Scopus citations


In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. This paper develops a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium in which players use information about opponents' payoffs in forming beliefs about the way that opponents play off of the equilibrium path. We show that this concept is robust to payoff uncertainty. We also discuss its relationship to other concepts and show that it is closely related to assuming almost common certainty of payoffs in an epistemic model with independent beliefs. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D84.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)165-185
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - Dec 1999


FundersFunder number
National Science FoundationSBR-93-20695, SBR-94-09302, SBR-9409180
Directorate for Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences9409180
University of California, Los Angeles


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