Abstract
This chapter discusses the economics and legal analysis of passive investment among competitors. It shows that, much like horizontal mergers, passive investment may have both unilateral and coordinated anticompetitive effects. I examine two special cases: (1) passive investment by a firm's controlling shareholder in the firm's competitor, and (2) multilateral passive investments.
| Original language | American English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Issues In Competition Law And Policy |
| Editors | Wayne D. Collins, Joseph Angland |
| Publisher | American Bar Association |
| Chapter | 67 |
| Pages | 1637-1660 |
| Volume | 3 |
| ISBN (Print) | 1604420449 |
| State | Published - 2008 |
Keywords
- partial ownership
- tacit collusion
- passive investment
- multilateral hodlings
- controlling shareholders
- facilitating practices
- solely for investment
- clayton act
