Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion

David Gilo; Yossi Moshe; Yossi Spiegel

doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00005.x

Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion

David Gilo^*, Yossi Moshe, Yossi Spiegel

^*Corresponding author for this work

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

176 Scopus citations

Abstract

We examine the effects that passive investments in rival firms have on the incentives of firms to engage in tacit collusion. In general, these incentives depend in a complex way on the entire partial cross ownership (PCO) structure in the industry. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for PCO arrangements to facilitate tacit collusion and also examine how tacit collusion is affected when firms' controllers make direct passive investments in rival firms.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	81-99
Number of pages	19
Journal	RAND Journal of Economics
Volume	37
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00005.x
State	Published - 2006

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Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion

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