Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion

David Gilo*, Yossi Moshe, Yossi Spiegel

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

158 Scopus citations


We examine the effects that passive investments in rival firms have on the incentives of firms to engage in tacit collusion. In general, these incentives depend in a complex way on the entire partial cross ownership (PCO) structure in the industry. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for PCO arrangements to facilitate tacit collusion and also examine how tacit collusion is affected when firms' controllers make direct passive investments in rival firms.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)81-99
Number of pages19
JournalRAND Journal of Economics
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2006


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