Pandora's auctions: Dynamic matching with unknown preferences

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title = "Pandora's auctions: Dynamic matching with unknown preferences",

author = "Daniel Fershtman and Alessandro Pavan",

year = "2017",

month = may,

doi = "10.1257/aer.p20171043",

language = "אנגלית",

volume = "107",

pages = "186--190",

journal = "American Economic Review",

issn = "0002-8282",

publisher = "American Economic Association",

number = "5",

}

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AU - Fershtman, Daniel

AU - Pavan, Alessandro

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SN - 0002-8282

VL - 107

SP - 186

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JO - American Economic Review

JF - American Economic Review

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