Owner-intruder conflict, grafen effect and self-assessment. The bourgeois principle re-examined

Ilan Eshel, Emilia Sansone

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

An owner-intruder conflict is analysed. While the Evolutionary Stable Strategies of both owner and intruder depend on the reproductive value of holding a territory or on the chance of getting one, the values (and, therefore, the relevant payment functions of the relevant population game) depend on the population strategy. Conditions for observed, evolutionarily stable, mixed strategies are analysed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)341-356
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Theoretical Biology
Volume177
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 1995

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