Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types

Jacques Crémer, Yossi Spiegel*, Charles Z. Zheng

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We study optimal auctions when contacting prospective bidders is costly and the bidders' values are correlated. Although full surplus extraction is, in general, impossible, we can construct a search mechanism that fully extracts the surplus with an arbitrarily high probability.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)94-100
Number of pages7
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number1
StatePublished - Oct 2006


  • Correlated values
  • Full surplus extraction
  • Optimal auction
  • Search costs
  • Search mechanism


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