@article{3173d7795f25461fa99a161a9c81663b,
title = "Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types",
abstract = "We study optimal auctions when contacting prospective bidders is costly and the bidders' values are correlated. Although full surplus extraction is, in general, impossible, we can construct a search mechanism that fully extracts the surplus with an arbitrarily high probability.",
keywords = "Correlated values, Full surplus extraction, Optimal auction, Search costs, Search mechanism",
author = "Jacques Cr{\'e}mer and Yossi Spiegel and Zheng, {Charles Z.}",
note = "Funding Information: Charles Zheng thanks the NSF for grant SES-0214471. ",
year = "2006",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.047",
language = "אנגלית",
volume = "93",
pages = "94--100",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "1",
}