TY - GEN
T1 - Optimal incentives for participation with type-dependent externalities
AU - Feldman, Michal
AU - Tessler, Ran
AU - Wilf, Yoav
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was partially supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant number 1219/09) and by the Leon Recanati Fund of the Jerusalem school of business administration.
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - We study a "principal-agent" setting in which a principal motivates a team of agents to participate in her project (e.g., friends in a social event or store owners in a shopping mall). A key element in our model is the externalities among the agents; i.e., the benefits that the agents gain from each others' participation. Bernstein and Winter [6] devised a basic model for this setting and characterized the optimal incentive mechanism inducing full participation as a unique Nash equilibrium. Here we suggest and embark on several generalizations and extensions to the basic model, which are grounded in real-life scenarios. First, we study the effect of side payments among the agents on the structure of the optimal mechanism and the principal's utility. Second, we study the optimal partition problem in settings where the principal operates multiple parallel projects.
AB - We study a "principal-agent" setting in which a principal motivates a team of agents to participate in her project (e.g., friends in a social event or store owners in a shopping mall). A key element in our model is the externalities among the agents; i.e., the benefits that the agents gain from each others' participation. Bernstein and Winter [6] devised a basic model for this setting and characterized the optimal incentive mechanism inducing full participation as a unique Nash equilibrium. Here we suggest and embark on several generalizations and extensions to the basic model, which are grounded in real-life scenarios. First, we study the effect of side payments among the agents on the structure of the optimal mechanism and the principal's utility. Second, we study the optimal partition problem in settings where the principal operates multiple parallel projects.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=76649130673&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_32
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_32
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AN - SCOPUS:76649130673
SN - 3642108407
SN - 9783642108402
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 351
EP - 361
BT - Internet and Network Economics - 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Proceedings
T2 - 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2009
Y2 - 14 December 2009 through 18 December 2009
ER -