TY - GEN
T1 - Online random sampling for budgeted settings
AU - Eden, Alon
AU - Feldman, Michal
AU - Vardi, Adi
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017.
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - We study online multi-unit auctions in which each agent’s private type consists of the agent’s arrival and departure times, valuation function and budget. Similarly to secretary settings, the different attributes of the agents’ types are determined by an adversary, but the arrival process is random. We establish a general framework for devising truthful random sampling mechanisms for online multi-unit settings with budgeted agents. We demonstrate the applicability of our framework by applying it to different objective functions (revenue and liquid welfare), and a range of assumptions about the agents’ valuations (additive or general) and the items’ nature (divisible or indivisible). Our main result is the design of mechanisms for additive bidders with budget constraints that extract a constant fraction of the optimal revenue, for divisible and indivisible items (under a standard large market assumption). We also show a mechanism that extracts a constant fraction of the optimal liquid welfare for general valuations over divisible items.
AB - We study online multi-unit auctions in which each agent’s private type consists of the agent’s arrival and departure times, valuation function and budget. Similarly to secretary settings, the different attributes of the agents’ types are determined by an adversary, but the arrival process is random. We establish a general framework for devising truthful random sampling mechanisms for online multi-unit settings with budgeted agents. We demonstrate the applicability of our framework by applying it to different objective functions (revenue and liquid welfare), and a range of assumptions about the agents’ valuations (additive or general) and the items’ nature (divisible or indivisible). Our main result is the design of mechanisms for additive bidders with budget constraints that extract a constant fraction of the optimal revenue, for divisible and indivisible items (under a standard large market assumption). We also show a mechanism that extracts a constant fraction of the optimal liquid welfare for general valuations over divisible items.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85029360190&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_3
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_3
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AN - SCOPUS:85029360190
SN - 9783319666990
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 29
EP - 40
BT - Algorithmic Game Theory - 10th International Symposium, SAGT 2017, Proceedings
A2 - Bilo, Vittorio
A2 - Flammini, Michele
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2017
Y2 - 12 September 2017 through 14 September 2017
ER -