One-sided patience with one-sided communication does not justify stackelberg equilibrium

Eddie Dekel, Joseph Farrell

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The theory of games (with complete information) in which a single patient longrun player faces a succession of short-run opponents cannot plausibly be used to justify the Stackelberg solution concept, because if that player can select which subgame-perfect equilibrium is to be played then she can presumably also change her selection. Consequently, while she can choose among one-shot Nash outcomes, she cannot achieve the Stackelberg outcome.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)299-303
Number of pages5
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume2
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1990
Externally publishedYes

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