TY - JOUR
T1 - One-sided patience with one-sided communication does not justify stackelberg equilibrium
AU - Dekel, Eddie
AU - Farrell, Joseph
N1 - Funding Information:
* We thank an associate editor for his comments, and the National Science Foundation (Grants SES 88 08133 and IRI 87 12238) for financial support.
PY - 1990/12
Y1 - 1990/12
N2 - The theory of games (with complete information) in which a single patient longrun player faces a succession of short-run opponents cannot plausibly be used to justify the Stackelberg solution concept, because if that player can select which subgame-perfect equilibrium is to be played then she can presumably also change her selection. Consequently, while she can choose among one-shot Nash outcomes, she cannot achieve the Stackelberg outcome.
AB - The theory of games (with complete information) in which a single patient longrun player faces a succession of short-run opponents cannot plausibly be used to justify the Stackelberg solution concept, because if that player can select which subgame-perfect equilibrium is to be played then she can presumably also change her selection. Consequently, while she can choose among one-shot Nash outcomes, she cannot achieve the Stackelberg outcome.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=38249017738&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/0899-8256(90)90001-B
DO - 10.1016/0899-8256(90)90001-B
M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???
AN - SCOPUS:38249017738
VL - 2
SP - 299
EP - 303
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
SN - 0899-8256
IS - 4
ER -