On the value of information in a strategic conflict

Morton I. Kamien*, Yair Tauman, Shmuel Zamir

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We consider a situation in which an agent M (the "maven") possesses information relevant to the players of an n-person game in which he is not a participant. We define the "inducible set" as the set of all outcomes which can be made unique Nash equilibria of a game resulting from the maven's transmission of information. This inducible set is a formal expression of M's ability to manipulate the game. We demonstrate some properties of the inducible set and characterize it for 2-person zero-sum games. Finally, we define the notion of the "value of information" possessed by M and provide an explicit formula to calculate this value in terms of the inducible set.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)129-153
Number of pages25
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
StatePublished - Jun 1990


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