On the social desirability of wealth-dependent fine policies

Moshe Bar Niv, Zvi Safra*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


To determine the rate of fines regulators typically employ two types of fine policies. The first establishes fixed and determined fines that are not contingent on the offender's wealth. The second establishes variable fines that are contingent on the offender's income, or wealth. In this paper we show that, in many situations, fine policies that are independent of the potential offenders' wealth are socially undesirable and are dominated by fine policies that are contingent on offenders' wealth.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)53-59
Number of pages7
JournalInternational Review of Law and Economics
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2002


  • Fine policies
  • Social desirability
  • Wealth


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