On the selection of arbitrators

Geoffroy De Clippel*, Kfir Eliaz, Brian Knight

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


A key feature of arbitration is the possibility for conflicting parties to participate in the selection of the arbitrator, the individual who will rule the case. We analyze this problem of the selection of arbitrators from the perspective of implementation theory. In particular, theoretical analyses document problems with veto-rank-a simultaneous procedure commonly used in practice-and develop a new sequential procedure-shortlisting-with better properties. Experimental results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, highlighting both the disadvantages associated with the veto-rank procedure and the advantages associated with the shortlisting procedure.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3434-3458
Number of pages25
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Issue number11
StatePublished - 1 Nov 2014


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