On the order of eliminating dominated strategies

I. Gilboa*, E. Kalai, E. Zemel

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

37 Scopus citations

Abstract

It is known that different orders of eliminating dominated strategies in n-person games may yield different reduced games. We give conditions which guarantee that the reduced game is unique. For finite games, the conditions include the well-known cases of strict dominance, and in a slightly weaker form, of regular dominance for zero sum and similar games.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)85-89
Number of pages5
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume9
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1990
Externally publishedYes

Funding

FundersFunder number
National Science FoundationIRI-8814672, SES-8720342

    Keywords

    • game theory
    • strategy domination

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