On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall

Michele Piccione*, Ariel Rubinstein

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We argue that in extensive decision problems (extensive games with a single player) withimperfectrecall care must be taken in interpreting information sets and strategies. Alternative interpretations allow for different kinds of analysis. We address the following issues: 1. randomization at information sets; 2. consistent beliefs; 3. time consistency of optimal plans; 4. the multiselves approach to decision making. We illustrate our discussion through an example that we call the "paradox of the absentminded driver."Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C7, D0.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3-24
Number of pages22
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume20
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1997

Funding

FundersFunder number
SSHRC-Canada
United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation1011-341

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