On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests

Zvika Neeman, Gerhard O. Orosel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We examine the conditions under which vote buying may promote efficiency in an environment where voters have identical preferences with respect to the behavior of their elected representatives (who are subject to both moral hazard and adverse selection). Our results suggest that permission of vote buying may prove beneficial in the market for corporate control and in some types of local political elections.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)536-556
Number of pages21
JournalInternational Review of Law and Economics
Volume26
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2006

Keywords

  • Control contest
  • Corporate control
  • Corporate governance
  • Proxy contest
  • Vote buying

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