On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests

Zvika Neeman; Gerhard O. Orosel

doi:10.1016/j.irle.2007.01.006

On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests

Zvika Neeman^*, Gerhard O. Orosel

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

We examine the conditions under which vote buying may promote efficiency in an environment where voters have identical preferences with respect to the behavior of their elected representatives (who are subject to both moral hazard and adverse selection). Our results suggest that permission of vote buying may prove beneficial in the market for corporate control and in some types of local political elections.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	536-556
Number of pages	21
Journal	International Review of Law and Economics
Volume	26
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2007.01.006
State	Published - Dec 2006

Keywords

Control contest
Corporate control
Corporate governance
Proxy contest
Vote buying

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1016/j.irle.2007.01.006

Cite this

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abstract = "We examine the conditions under which vote buying may promote efficiency in an environment where voters have identical preferences with respect to the behavior of their elected representatives (who are subject to both moral hazard and adverse selection). Our results suggest that permission of vote buying may prove beneficial in the market for corporate control and in some types of local political elections.",

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KW - Corporate control

KW - Corporate governance

KW - Proxy contest

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On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

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