On selecting the right agent

Geoffroy de Clippel, Kfir Eliaz, Daniel Fershtman, Kareen Rozen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Each period, a principal must assign one of two agents to a new task. Each agent privately learns whether he is qualified for the task. An agent wishes to be chosen independently of qualification and chooses whether to apply for the task. The principal wishes to appoint the most qualified agent and chooses which agent to assign as a function of the public history of profits. We fully characterize when the principal's first-best payoff is attainable in equilibrium and identify a simple strategy profile achieving this first-best whenever feasible. Additionally, we provide a partial characterization of the case with many agents and discuss how our analysis extends to other variations of the game.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)381-402
Number of pages22
JournalTheoretical Economics
Volume16
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2021

Keywords

  • C73
  • D23
  • Dynamic allocation without transfers
  • repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'On selecting the right agent'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this