Abstract
In the Libet paradigm, subjects move their hand at will and report when they first felt the urge to move; information about the upcoming movement was shown to exist in their brains up to 10 seconds before movement onset. These results led some to conclude that conscious decisions are not part of the causal chain leading to action. However, various conceptual and experimental criticisms were raised against this paradigm. This chapter focuses on the reliability of self-reporting intention onset. Research suggests that it is inaccurate and biased, varying considerably with the reporting method and possibly computed retrospectively from movement time. In fact, the idea of a clear onset of intention apparently relies on an intuitively appealing but increasingly challenged model of decision making. This chapter suggests that the Libet studies may be inherently flawed and that the field should not rely on self-reporting of intention onset.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Surrounding Free Will: |
Subtitle of host publication | Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience |
Editors | Alfred R. Mele |
Place of Publication | Oxford |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 184-202 |
Number of pages | 19 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199333950 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2015 |
Externally published | Yes |