On maxsum fair cake divisions

Steven J. Brams, Michal Feldman, John K. Lai, Jamie Morgenstern, Ariel D. Procaccia

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We consider the problem of selecting fair divisions of a heterogeneous divisible good among a set of agents. Recent work (Cohler et al., AAAI 2011) focused on designing algorithms for computing maxsum - social welfare maximizing - allocations under the fairness notion of envyfreeness. Maxsum allocations can also be found under alternative notions such as equitability. In this paper, we examine the properties of these allocations. In particular, we provide conditions for when maxsum envy-free or equitable allocations are Pareto optimal and give examples where fairness with Pareto optimality is not possible. We also prove that maxsum envy-free allocations have weakly greater welfare than maxsum equitable allocations when agents have structured valuations, and we derive an approximate version of this inequality for general valuations.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAAAI-12 / IAAI-12 - Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 24th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference
Pages1285-1291
Number of pages7
StatePublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes
Event26th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 24th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-12 / IAAI-12 - Toronto, ON, Canada
Duration: 22 Jul 201226 Jul 2012

Publication series

NameProceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume2

Conference

Conference26th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 24th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-12 / IAAI-12
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityToronto, ON
Period22/07/1226/07/12

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